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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Focus of the Paper
This paper examines the prospects for regulatory reform in Canada. The
particular concern is with the prospects for the elimination or liberalization of
direct iegulation in such industries as telecommunications, airlines, trucking,
and agriculture.' In an earlier paper, it was estimated that about 29% of
Canada's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at factor cost is subject to some type
of direct regulation by one or more levels of government. 2
Within the field of direct regulation analysis was further narrowed to the
role of the federal government as regulator. This was done for two reasons.
First, it is easier to analyse the prospects of regulatory reform for one govern-
ment than it is for 10 or 11. Second, in many directly regulated industries, the
federal government has exclusive jurisdiction (for example, airlines) or is the
leading regulatory authority (for example, telecommunications).
3
In this paper, the term regulatory reform is used to refer to (i) outright
deregulation of industry-specific controls over price or entry/output, or (ii)
substantial liberalization of a regime of direct regulation that results in
significantly greater reliance on competition.
B. Background
Although the process of regulatory reform has been underway for at least
five years very few substantive or procedural changes have been achieved. 4
With respect to procedural matters one can point to the federal Socio-
Economic Impact Analysis requirement which came into effect in August
1978. 5 As for substantive reform, the following changes come to mind: the
liberalization of regulation of government policy toward the airlines; 6 the new
' We follow the definition of direct or industry-specific regulation provided by the
Economic Council of Canada [hereinafter ECC] in Responsible Regulation (Ottawa:
Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1979) at 44. Typically, direct regulation in-
volves government control over one or more of the following: price (rate structure), rate
of return, entry, exit, or output.
2 Stanbury and Thompson, "The Scope and Coverage of Regulation in Canada
and the United States: Implications for the Demand for Reform" in Stanbury, ed.,
Government Regulation: Scope, Growth, Process (Montreal: The Inst. for Research on
Pub. Pol'y, 1980) 33. The proportion in the United States is estimated to be 26 percent.
3 Telecommunications has been the subject of a jurisdictional dispute between the
federal and provincial governments for some years now. The issues are discussed in the
papers in Telecommunications Regulation and the Constitution (Montreal: The Inst.
for Research on Pub. Pol'y, 1982).
4A far more detailed discussion is given in Stanbury and Thompson, Regulatory
Reform in Canada (Montreal: The Inst. for Research on Pub. Pol'y, 1982).
5 See the discussion in Anderson, "The Federal Regulation-Making Process and
Regulatory Reform, 1969-1979," in Stanbury, ed., supra note 2, at 151; and see
Treasury Board Canada, Administrative Policy Manual, (Ottawa: n. pub., 1979)
ch. 490.6See Reschenthaler and Stanbury, Canadian Airlines and the Visible Hand
(manuscript in preparation for The Inst. for Research on Pub. Pol'y mimeo, 1982).
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Bank Act 7 effective in December 1980; and the federal Access to Information
Act8 which was enacted, albeit in a weak form, in June 1982.
The great bulk of reform efforts has consisted of studies of the regulatory
process, including regulatory agencies, and official inquiries initiated by the
federal and provincial governments, notably Ontario. 9 Studies of the
regulatory process and of the efforts of various types of government regula-
tion have been conducted for the Law Reform Commission, 10 the Institute for
Research on Public Policy,1 ' the Ontario Economic Council, 12 the Economic
Council of Canada i3 and the Canadian Consumer Council. 14 Official inquiries
7 See LaBrosse, Canada's New Banking Legislation (1980), 7 Can Bus. Rev. and see
"Here come the foreign banks", Financial Times of Canada, Sept. 14, 1981 at 23,
col. 1.
8 The Liberal government published a Green Paper, Can. Legislation on PublicAc-
cess to Government Documents (Ottawa: Secretary of State) in June 1977. It was tabled
in the House on June 29, 1977 and was referred to the Standing Joint Committee on
Regulations and Other Statutory Instruments on December 16, 1977. It is discussed in
the Committee's fifth report to Parliament in its Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence,
Issue 34, June 27, 1978. In 1977 the Canadian Bar Association published Rankin's
Freedom of Information in Canada: Will the Doors Stay Shut? (Ottawa: CBA, August
1977) and in early 1979 the Bar Association published its own Freedom of Information
in Canada: A Model Bill (Ottawa: CBA, 1979). More generally, see Priest, Provision of
Information in the Context of Regulation, Technical Report No. 22 (Ottawa: Economic
Council of Canada, 1982).
9See Gordon, Report to the Cabinet on Improving the Regulatory Process,
(Toronto: Queen's Park, 1979) and ECC, Regulation Reference: A Preliminary Report
(Ottawa: ECC 1978) at 55-59; Ont., The Report of the Professional Organizations
Committee (Toronto: Min. of the A.G., 1980); and Ont., Commission on Freedom of
Information and Individual Privacy, Report (Toronto: Ont. Queen's Printer, 1980).
For a more comprehensive discussion see Stanbury and Thompson, supra note 4.
10 See, e.g., Law Reform Commission Working Paper No. 25, Independent Ad-
ministrative Agencies (Ottawa: Min. of Supply and Services Can., 1980). A complete
list of LRC studies can be found in Stanbury and Thompson, supra note 4.
11 See, e.g., Stanbury, Studies on Regulation in Canada (Montreal: The Inst. for
Research on Pub. Pol'y, 1978); Reschenthaler and Roberts, eds., Perspectives on Cana-
dian Airline Regulation (Montreal: The Inst. for Research on Pub. Pol'y, 1979); and
Stanbury, ed., supra note 2.
12 Ontario Economic Council (OEC), Government Regulation (Toronto: OEC,
1978). The volume included papers on markets for regulation (Trebilcock et al.), the
Ontario Milk Marketing Board (Broadwith, Hughes and Assoc.), highway trucking
regulation (Bonsor), and an inventory of Ontario's agencies, boards, commissions and
advisory bodies (Bresner et al.).
13 See, supra note 1 and ECC, Reforming Regulation, 1981 (Ottawa: Min. of Sup-
ply and Services Can., 1981). The Council commissioned over 50 studies. A list is given
in Stanbury and Thompson, supra note 4.
14 In June 1973 the Council presented A Report on the Consumer Interest in
Regulatory Boards andAgencies (Ottawa: Can. Consumer Council, 1973). It summarized
a considerable number of studies released in working paper form during 1972 and 1973.
The best known study was released in September 1974, when the Consumer Research
Council, successor to the Canadian Consumer Council, published A Report on Con-
sumer Interest in Marketing Boards (Ottawa: Consumer Research Council, 1974) which
was prepared by Professor Forbes and seven other academics. It was based on a series of
working papers released during 1973 and 1974.
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include the Ontario Professional Organizations Committee and Commission
on Freedom of Information and Individual Privacy, 15 the Regulation
Reference of the Economic Council of Canada, 16 the Parliamentary Task
Force on Regulatory Reform (the Peterson Committee),' 7 and the Lambert
Commission.' 8 All have offered considered and specific recommendations for
improving procedures and process.
The various studies are largely in agreement as to what should be done: ex
ante review of proposed regulations using cost-benefit analysis; earlier and
more extensive consultation; creation of a regulatory agenda; periodic expost
review of existing regulatory programmes; the replacement of appeals to cabinet
by government policy directives; clearer regulatory mandates in statutes and
regulations; closer scrutiny of proposed new regulations and evaluation of
existing ones by the legislature; and improved access and funding of "public
interest groups". While critics such as Courville describe such proposals as
"the regulation of regulation",' 9 the support for their adoption includes the
Ontario Economic Council, the Economic Council of Canada, the Law
Reform Commission, the Lambert Commission, the Peterson Committee and
a number of academics who have written extensively on regulation. The point
is that a respectable body of opinion is saying essentially the same thing.
The federal and provincial governments have done almost nothing to in-
stitutionalize regulatory reform. For a short time, British Columbia established
a Ministry of Deregulation 20 but it was eliminated after having been allowed to
accomplish nothing of any substance while serving as a very useful political
symbol. Ontario appointed an Associate Secretary to Cabinet to push and co-
ordinate the cutting of red tape, better service to the public and deregulation.
A few modest changes resulted. 21 It might be noted that the support of the
business community was underwhelming. In Nova Scotia a Task Force on
Deregulation and Paperburden prepared two thoughtful and pragmatic
reports. 22 Nothing was done. The federal government created the Office of the
Is See The Report of the Professional Organizations Committee, supra note 9.
16 See Regulation Reference: A Preliminary Report, supra note 13.
17The Committee received 89 written submissions and heard more than 50
witnesses. See Special Committee on Regulatory Reform, Report (Ottawa: Min. of Sup-
ply and Services Can., 1981) at 45-50.
18 Can., Royal Commission on Financial Management and Accountability, Final
Report (Ottawa: Min. of Supply and Services Can., 1979).
19 Courville, Responsible Regulation: Rules versus Incentives (Montreal: C.D.
Howe Research Inst., 1980) at 1.
20 See Enemark, "Deregulation: Possibilities and Prospects" in Aucoin, ed., The
Politics and Management of Restraint in Government (Montreal: The Inst. for
Research on Pub. Pol'y, 1981) 138-42.
21 See Gordon, supra note 9.
22 Nova Scotia, Premier's Task Force on Deregulation and Paperburden, Interim
Report (Halifax: n. pub., 1981) and Final Report (Halifax: n. pub., 1981). We might
note that in New Brunswick where the Department of the Attorney General passed the
word that all items of subordinate legislation would be carefully scrutinized by its of-
ficials, the volume of new regulations coming forward declined very noticeably.
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Coordinator, Regulatory Reform (OCRR) in the fall of 1979. 23 Two years later
its total complement is fewer than a dozen. Moreover, OCRR's mandate was
scheduled to expire in June 1982. It appears to have been extended to March
31, 1983.
The studies of direct regulation, while not as numerous as those of the
regulatory process, also come to essentially the same conclusion; namely that
economic efficiency would be improved by outright deregulation or by a much
less restrictive regulatory regime. This conclusion applies to airlines,
railroads-which are already far less stringently regulated, agricultural
marketing boards-particularly the supply management type, telecommunica-
tions, trucking, and the local regulation of taxi cabs. Fortunately, almost every
critic recognizes the political power of entrenched interests that now benefit
from direct regulation and the need to offer a realistic plan of how to "get
from here to there," for example, through gradualism, by paying compensa-
tion and by only partial deregulation.
24
While the amount of regulatory reform has been very small, and in some
cases only tangentially related to mainstream efforts, there overhangs the
political market a considerable body of official and academic literature recom-
mending regulatory reform. In general, politicians profess immunity from
such literature-unless, of course, it becomes expedient to recognize its utility
in order to support a decision already made. Yet we are reminded of Keynes'
remark that politicians may be captive of the ideas of an academic scribbler of
some years past.
In what was perhaps the Economic Council's most vigorous stand on
public policy in nearly a decade, it recently recommended the elimination or
relaxation of direct regulation in industries such as telecommunications,
airlines, taxis, trucking, and agriculture. (The Council's major recommenda-
tions concerning direct regulation are reproduced in Appendix A.) What is the
probability that these recommendations will be accepted and enacted into law?
It is highly unlikely that the present Cabinet will seek to promote com-
prehensive regulatory reform or even the dismantling of direct regulation in a
few industries. The Prime Minister's attentions are otherwise engaged (his
23 The role of OCRR, to be held to "a very small operation," the present Minister
(Donald Johnston) emphasized, was described as follows: "On the whole, specific pro-
posals for change will come from my colleagues who are responsible, by statute, for
various regulatory activities. My role will be to encourage ministers and their officials to
consider regulatory change and to support them in their efforts." Mr. Johnston described
the activities of OCRR as including the elimination of unused, ineffective and
undesirable laws; the improvement of consultation with the private sector early in the
process of regulation; consideration of extending the application of SEIA; application
of the Controller-General's programme evaluation work to regulatory programmes; ex-
ploration of greater use of the consensus process to develop regulatory standards; and co-
ordination of the implementation of the Cabinet's decision on records retention by
business. See "Notes for an Address by the Hon. Donald J. Johnston, President of the
Treasury Board of Canada to the Advisory Committee of the Canadian Manufacturers'
Association," Toronto, Jan. 22, 1981 at4, 5-9.
24 See Reforming Regulation 1981, supra note 13. For an analysis of the reaction to
this report, see Stanbury and Thompson, supra note 4.
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retirement, national unity, North-South dialogue and now the weakness of the
economy despite the Budgets of November 1981 and June 1982). Many, if not
most, Liberal Cabinet Ministers appear to believe that more government is bet-
ter than less. 25 Further, this belief is very likely shared by a majority of their
constituents. Consequently, it is hardly surprising that the major thrust of the
Trudeau government is in the direction of greater, more comprehensive in-
tervention in the economy, not less. 26 It seems to us that even pragmatic,
worthwhile proposals such as those offered by the Economic Council (Appen-
dix A) that run counter to this trend are unlikely to meet with a positive
response from the current government. 27 We would, of course, be very pleased
to be wrong.
C. Organization of the Paper
The main body of the paper is divided into two main parts. Section II
reviews interest group theory as it has been applied to regulation. It is found
that the deregulation, in varying degrees, of airlines, natural gas, telecom-
munications, trucking, railroads and banking in the United States would not
be predicted by such theory. We then offer an alternative explanation of
American deregulation based on three exogenous and three endogenous
factors.
Section III examines the prospects for regulatory reform in Canada. The
same three exogenous factors, that is, condition of the economy, technological
change and the power of ideas are reviewed. The first two are found to be
similar to those in the United States. We then assess the consequences of three
different endogenous factors in the Canadian case. The legislative process, the
failure of party politics and the importance of the bureaucracy all militate
against the dismantling of direct regulation in Canada.
In Section IV we briefly draw our conclusions and offer two recommen-
dations.
25Even the allegedly "watered-down" federal government document: Can.,
Economic Developmentfor Canada in the 1980s (Ottawa: Nov., 1981.).
2 One has only to recall the following examples in the past few years:
(i) the creation of Petro-Canada in 1975;
(ii) the establishment of the National Energy Program in October 1980;
(ill) the assistance given to Chrysler Canada and Massey Ferguson;
(iv) efforts by the federal government to gain policy control of the Canada
Development Corporation in 1981;
(v) the creation of an Office of Industrial and Regional Benefits in response to
the Report of Major Projects Task Force (the Blair-Carr report, 1981);
(vi) creation of Canadian Industrial Renewal Board to coordinate the federal
government's industrial adjustment programmes in the clothing, textile and footwear
sectors;
(vii) the Kirby task force (Jan., 1982) to recommend what actions the federal
government should take regarding the severely depressed Atlantic fisheries;
(viii) Agricultural Minister Eugene Whelan's proposal to create a new Crown
corporation, Canagrex, to help increase exports of agricultural products (Jan., 1982);
and
(ix) the six and five per cent wage and price guidelines in the June 1982 budget.
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II. INTEREST GROUP THEORY AND
AMERICAN REGULATORY REFORM
There is now a large set of prescriptions in the Canadian literature on
regulatory reform waiting to be applied. The remaining obstacles to change are
largely political. Hence, the initial question "What are the prospects for
regulatory reform in Canada?" maybe restated as "What is the likelihood
that the political obstacles to change will be overcome?" or, perhaps, "How
can these obstacles be overcome?"
To answer these questions, Canadians tend to turn instinctively to the
United States. The regulatory issues are similar; 28 so too are many of the
political obstacles to change. Canadians ought, therefore, to be able to learn
from American experience. Furthermore, the United States has produced a
prolific literature on political and administrative processes that may be of use
in answering questions of political feasibility. In making use of it, however,
one must be careful to take account of the differences in political institutions
and culture between the United States and Canada.
Nevertheless, it is submitted that many of the scholars who have expounded
the politics of regulatory reform in Canada, ourselves included, 29 have relied
far too uncritically on American political theory, especially interest group
theory, and too little on American political experience. In making this obser-
vation, interest group theory is not rejected, nor even American interest group
theory. Interest groups play an undeniable role in policy formulation and im-
plementation in Canada. 30 But it is an error to treat interest group politics as if
it were the only politics. It is not. In many cases it is not even the dominant
politics.
A. Interest Group Politics and Regulation
According to the interest group theory of politics, the role of government
in general, and of regulation in particular, has always been and must inevitably
27 Some of the reasons for this are discussed in Stanbury and Thompson, Hurdles
to Dismantling Direct Regulation (1981), 8 Can. Bus. Rev. 25; Reschenthaler, Stanbury
and Thompson, Whatever Happened to Deregulation (1982), 3 Pol'y Options.28 See, e.g., Stanbury and Thompson, supra note 2.
291 d. See also Thompson and Stanbury, The Political Economy of Interest Groups
in the Legislative Process in Canada (Montreal: Inst. for Research on Pub. Pol'y,
1979); Stanbury, "Reforming Regulation in Canada: Political Pressure and Policy
Responses," in Ziegel, ed., Papers and Comments delivered at the Eighth Annual
Workshop on Commercial and Consumer Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1980) 115;
Stanbury, "Restraining the State: The Role of Deregulation," in Aucoin, supra note
20, at 145; Thompson, "Regulatory Reform and Deregulation in the United States," in
Stanbury, ed., supra note 2.30See, e.g., Stanbury, "Lobbying and Interest Group Representation in the
Legislative Process," in Neilson and MacPherson, eds., The Legislative Process in
Canada: The Need for Reform (Montreal: The Inst. for Research on Pub. Pol'y, 1978)
ch. 6; Van Loon and Whittington, The Canadian Political System (2nd ed. Toronto:
McGraw-Hill, 1976) 297; Pross, ed., Pressure Group Behaviour in Canadian Politics
(Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1975).
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be that of arbiter among competing economic claimants. 31 Hence, regulatory
policies are simply a "fulcrum upon which contending interests seek to exer-
cise leverage in their pursuit of wealth." 32 Policy outcomes may be explained
by "a theory of the optimum size of political coalition .... -33 In this theory,
the demand for regulation is a function of the benefits to be derived from the
use of government power to increase the wealth of group members and the cost
of organization. 34 The supply of regulation is a function of the level of opposi-
tion to the group's demands and the rules that govern collective decision-
making. According to Peltzman, for example:
The essential commodity being transacted in the political market is a transfer of
wealth, with constituents on the demand side and their political representatives on
the supply side. Viewed in this way, the markets here, as elsewhere, will distribute
more of the good to those whose effective demand is highest.
35
In other words, regulatory outcomes are predictable consequences of personal
tastes and capabilities working through the political and administrative pro-
cesses by which policy is formulated. 36 Furthermore, this view implies that
regulatory initiatives that have survived the keen competition for votes must
represent relatively efficient means of redistributing resources. 37 Consequently,
carried to its logical extreme, this view implies that, under existing political
31 See, e.g., Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public
Opinion (New York: Knopf, 1951); Key, Politics, Parties & Pressure Groups (5th ed.
New York: Crowell, 1964); Latham, The Group Basis of Politics: A Study in Basing-
Point Legislation (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell U. Press, 1952); and Bentley, The Process of
Government (reprint 1908 ed. Evanston, Illinois: The Principia Press of Illinois, 1967).
More recent works on interest groups and lobbying include Moe, The Organization of
Interests (Chicago: U. of Chi. Press, 1980) which extends and modifies Olson's work
(see, supra note 7) by analyzing the determinants of membership, the types of group
participants and the nature of group leadership. See also Berry, Lobbying for the Peo-
ple (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U. Press, 1977); Wagner, "Pressure Groups and
Political Entrepreneurs: A Review Article," 1 Papers on Non-Market Decision Making
(Charlottesville, Va.: Thomas Jefferson Center for Political Econ., U. of Va., 1969) 151;
Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Young, Political Leadership and Collective Goods
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U. Press, 1971); and Greenwald, Group Power: Lobbying
andPublic Policy (New York: Praeger, 1977).
32 Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation (1976), 19 J.L. & Econ.
211 at 212.
33 Id.
34 See, e.g., Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation (1971), 2 Bell J. Econ. &
Mgt. Sci. 3; Wilson, "The Politics of Regulation," in McKie, ed., SocialResponsibility
and the Business Predicament (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1974);
Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation (1974), 5 Bell J. Econ. & Mgt. Sci. 335. For
theoretical antecedents, see Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Public Goods and
the Theory of Groups (2nd ed. New York: Schocken, 1971); and Downs, An Economic
Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1957). Imaginative generalizations
and extensions can be found in Peltzman, The Growth of Government (1980), 23 J.L. &
Econ. 209 and in Becker, A Theory of Political Behavior (unpublished L. and Econ.
Workshop Series paper WS IV-4, U. of Toronto 1981, mimeo).
35 Peltzman, supra note 32, at 212.
36 Becker, Comment [on Peltzman] (1976), 19 J.L. & Econ. 245.
37Id. at 247. See also Becker, supra note 34.
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rules-and given information and transaction costs-the existing pattern of
regulation is "optimal". 3
8
Optimal is, of course, not used here in the normative sense of that word.
Not at least if one is willing to admit the possibility of political market
failures39 analogous to economic market failures. 40 In this case, "political
market failure" occurs because efficiency, as opposed to income redistribu-
tion, is a public good in the technical sense. 4 1 In Canada, this perspective is
most forcefully elaborated by Trebilcock, et al.42 and by Hartle,43 who clearly
imply that the principal purpose of regulation is the redistribution of income
to specific groups. 44 They further imply that the gains from regulation will
tend to go to a small fraction of the community, that most others will be ex-
cluded from these gains, and that the gains will come at the expense of
38To be fair, three points should be made. First, this conclusion is Becker's (id.)
and is not necessarily shared by his peers. Furthermore, it is intended as a statement of
positive, not normative economics. Second, Peltzman insists that the American political
process will seldom, if ever, produce policies benefitting only producers (or consumers).
He has recently explained that the necessary conditions for legislative action in this area
will usually comprehend "a potential market failure that makes it credible for a coali-
tion of producers and consumers.., to seek regulation." His point is that regulation
can and very likely will be made to serve a producer interest at the same time it corrects a
potential market failure, thereby enlarging the supporting coalition to minimum win-
ning size and enhancing the political survival value of the regulatory institutions
(Peltzman, "Current Developments in the Economics of Regulation," in Gary Fromm,
ed., Studies in Public Regulation (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1981) at 375).
Third, this model is not merely about regulation. Stigler, for example, has proposed
"that it will be found useful ... to explain tariffs, controls over energy industries,
minimum wage laws, environmental controls, OSHA, and the structure of the tax
system" ("Comment on Joskow and Noll," in Fromm, id. at 74). Indeed, viewed as a
partial, positive theory of legislative decision making, the "economic theory of regula-
tion" clearly improves upon traditional interest group theory and its power to explain
political outcomes. It is an improvement in rigour, clarity and subtlety. We freely grant
its potential utility - in its proper sphere.
39 See, e.g., Wolf, A Theory of Non-market Failure: Framework for Implementa-
tion Analysis (1979), 22 J.L. & Econ. 107; Trebilcock, Waverman and Prichard,
"Markets for Regulation: Implications for Performance Standards and Institutional
Design" in OEC, supra note 12 at 39-42; Thompson and Stanbury, supra note 4 at
18-19; and Rowley, "Market 'Failure' and Government 'Failure'," The Economics of
Politics (London: Inst. of Econ. Aff., 1978) 29.
40 For example, natural monopolies, externalities, common property resources, im-
perfect information/uncertainty, "destructive" competition. Wolf would include cer-
tain income distributions as a form of market failure. See, supra note 39, at 110-12.
41 See, e.g., Head, Public Goods andPublic Policy (1962), 17 Pub. Finance 197.
42 Trebilcock et al., supra note 39.
43 Hartle, Public Policy Decision Making and Regulation (Montreal: The Inst. for
Research on Pub. Pol'y, 1979).
44 This view was commonly associated with Stigler, supra note 34, at 3 who has said
"as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily
for its benefit." The ECC's Interim Report, supra note 1, at 49-52, notes that regulation
has been used for such distributive objectives as constraining monopoly profits,
preventing "unjust" price discrimination, reducing the impact of economic change and
to engage in cross-subsidization. More generally, see Mitnick, The PoliticalEconomy of
Regulation (New York: Columbia U. Press, 1980) at ch. III.
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economic efficiency. In turn, these arguments rest on the belief that special
(that is, narrowly focused) economic interests are at an advantage in dealing
with the free rider problem that militates against interest group formation.
They also rest on the assumption that only the losers or potential losers in com-
petitive private market transactions are likely to seek redress in the political
arena.
It is not sufficient to refute such claims as incompatible with the facts of
political conflict, which by its very nature involves a broader segment of the
public in the determination of outcomes and not merely that portion of the
public having a direct or immediate interest in them. 45 This is, in part, because
exclusive special interests can triumph by disguising themselves in such a way
as to obtain the support of the broader public.
46
Those who would deny the political feasibility of regulatory reform, imply
that, in this instance, income redistribution has succeeded in its disguise. In
particular, they hold that such purported benefits of regulation as the promo-
tion of a sense of national identity, among others are successful masquerades
by which special interests are held to be in "the public interest". 47 Further-
more, they hold that the growth of regulatory activities in Canada has occurred
because this masquerade has reached new levels of sophistication and
effectiveness.
48
The importance of interest groups in determining the prospects for
regulatory reform has also been emphasized in the press. Columnist Gwyn, for
example, commenting on the Economic Council's recommendations, said:
The ideal of regulatory reform, therefore, comes acropper upon the hard prac-
ticality that in politics, the particular interest always defeats the general interest.
Consumers, of whom there are about 24 million, are numerous all right. But
they are unorganized and their interests are diffuse.
45 See Schattschneider, The SemiSovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy
in America (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), at 35 who states: "[Tihe
flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper class ac-
cent. Probably about 90 per cent of the people cannot get into the pressure system." See
also, Lowi, The End of Liberalism (New York: Norton, 1969) for a thoughtful critique
of "interest group liberalism".
46 We need hardly stress the utility of cloaking oneself in the flag, likening one's in-
terests to motherhood and, in the Canadian context, speaking of "maintaining national
unity while recognizing our rich diversity" and at all times exhibiting exemplary
"fairness". On the power of political symbolism see Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of
Politics (Urbana, Ill.: U. of Illinois Press, 1967) and Hartle, supra note 43, at ch. 4.
47 See, e.g., Migu6 in Nationalistic Policies in Canada: An Economic Approach
(Montreal: C.D. Howe Research Inst. 1979) at 71 who states that: "Because of the im-
perfections of [the representative government's] operation the political process is often
dominated by a series of minorities who exploit the population as a whole to their ad-
vantage." On the economics of interest group politics generally, see Migu6, at 56-61.
48 See Migu6, id. On the other hand, Ostry, Government Intervention: Canada and
the United States Compared (1980), 1 Pol'y Options 30, offers a sympathetic view of in-
tervention for cultural objectives. She describes Canada as a "marginal society" and
Canadians as "traditionally... willing to accept a more active public role than might be
agreeable to their southern neighbours."
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Regulated industries or professions... are few in numbers, but are superbly
organized and their interest, which is self-interest, is precise and is potent. 49
A noted financial columnist argued that "deregulation is doomed from
the start" because the airlines, truckers, taxi owners, professional groups and
farmers will lobby hard against it, and consumers, those who stand to gain,
"seem incapable of putting up a fight for anything." (There are, of course,
technical reasons such as the "free rider" problem why this is the case.) With
respect to agricultural supply management schemes he noted that "who-
ever has the economics [of quotas] right, the farm federation has the politics
right . ".."50
B. Anomalies
In applying conventional interest group theory to American regulatory
policy, one is struck by some rather serious anomalies. Many of the regulatory
reforms that have taken place in the United States are inconsistent with the
predictions of the interest group model. Air freight has been completely
deregulated.51 Airline prices and routes have been almost totally
decontrolled.5 2 The legalized fixing of brokers' commissions in the securities
industry has been abolished.5 3 Federal legislation permitting state 'fair trade'
(resale price maintenance) laws has been repealed.5 4 Controls on broadcasting
and cable television have been relaxed.5 5 So too, controls on the well-head
price and the allocation of natural gas and oil have been mitigated or
eliminated altogether. 56 Trucking and railroad regulations have been liberalized,
although the final result remains uncertain.5 7 Entry conditions into the
telecommunications industry have been made relatively easy and other changes
have been made to facilitate competition. 58 Weighed against the overall scope
and domain of government regulation of economic activity in the United
49 ",Report headed for the shelf", The Citizen (Ottawa), June 16, 1981 at 6, col. 3.
A more comprehensive analysis of interest group reactions to the Council's recommen-
dations is given in Stanbury and Thompson, supra note 4 at ch. 4.50 "It seems deregulation's headed down the tubes", The Citizen (Ottawa), June
12, 1981 at 13, col. 1.51See, e.g., Keyes, Regulatory Reform in Air Cargo Transportation (Washington,
D.C.: American Enterprise Inst., 1980).
52See Ellison, U.S. Airline Deregulation: Implications for Canada, Technical
Report No. 11 (Ottawa: ECC, 1981). See also the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 49
USC § 1301. See also "Upstarts in the Sky: Here comes a new kind of airline", Business
Week, 15 June 1981 at 77-92. Meyer et al., Airline Deregulation-The Early Experience
(Cambridge, Mass.: Auburn House, 1981).
53 See the Securities Act Amendments of 1975 15 USC, 1975 § 78; enacted June 4,
1975. It abolished fixed commission rates and minimum commissions. The results are
described in Eisenach and Miller, Price Competition on the NYSE (1981), 5 Regula-
tion 16.
54 See the Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, 15 USC § 1 effectively repealed the
Miller-Tydings Act of 1937 and the McGuire Act of 1952. The new legislation said that
enactment of laws by any state which permitted producers to set minimum prices for
brand name products at the retail level would be in violation of federal antitrust laws.
(Note-in Canada resale price maintenance (and refusal to deal) was made illegal in
December 1951, per the Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C. 1927 c.26 as amended by
R.S. 1951 c. 30.
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States, these reforms may not be overwhelming. But weighed against the
predictions of the interest group theory of regulation they are very
surprising.
5 9
" See the Communications Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-234, 470 U.S.C. § 609, in-
troduced in June 1978 by Congressmen Van Deerlin and Frey and § 270 re radio
deregulation and § 601 re T.V. licensing. See also "The FCC: On a new wavelength",
Business Week, 25 May 1981 at 172. See also Untying Cable Knots (1979), 3 Regulation
11. More generally, see Telecommunications Law Reform (Washington, D.C.:
American Enterprise Inst., 1980); and MacAvoy, ed., Deregulation of Cable Television
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Inst., 1977). The best study of the regulation
and deregulation of cable television is Besen and Crandall, The Deregulation of Cable
Television (1981), 44 Law & Contemp. Prob. 77. In January 1979 the FCC ended
Western Union's monopoly in telegraph message service and approved the application
of Graphnet Systems, Inc. to become its first competitor. See Kramer, "In Telegrams
Voted by FCC" Washington Post, Jan. 26, 1981.
56 See the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 49 U.S.C. § 10101.
For more recent developments, see "A new route for decontrolling gas", Business
Week, 29 July 1981 at 50. See also Mead, "The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978: An
Economic Evaluation" in Feilner, ed., AEI Studies on Contemporary Economic Prob-
lems, 1979 (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Inst., 1979) at 325-56; and Malbin,
"Congress, Policy Analysis, and Natural Gas Deregulation: A Parable About Fig
Leaves" in Goldwin, ed., Bureaucrats, Policy Analysts, Statesmen: Who Leads?
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Inst., 1980), ch. 5. The costs and benefits of
decontrolling crude oil prices are analyzed in Arrow and Kalt, Petroleum Price Regula-
tion: Should We Decontrol? (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Inst., 1979).
47See the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296 enacted in early July
1980. A brief description can be found in Reforming Trucking Regulation (1980), 4
Regulation 10. The Antitrust and Trade Regulation Reporter (7-10-80, at A-13, A-14)
also describes the legislation. The path to trucking deregulation has not been smooth.
See Re-Regulating at the ICC: 'The Congress Made them Do It' (1981), 5 Regulation 5;
and Friedman, "The Rocky Road for Truckers", New York Times, Jan. 24, 1982 see. 3
at 1, col. 3. Regarding railroads see Proposals for Railroad Regulatory Reform, 1980
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Inst., 1980). Generally, see MacAvory and
Snow, eds., Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform (Washington, D.C.:
American Enterprise Inst., 1977) concerning the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory
Reform Act of 1976. See also Caves et al., The High Cost of Regulating U.S. Railroads
(1981), 5 Regulation 41; Levin and Stratn, Nursing the Railroads Back to Health (1981),
5 Regulation 29.
58Generally see Comptroller General of the United States, Legislative and
Regulatory Actions Needed to Deal With a Changing Domestic Telecommunications
Industry (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, 1981). In addition, we
note that the settlement of the Department of Justice's case against AT&T will further
increase competition in the telecommuncations industry-"AT&T is now ready to deal
with Justice", Business Week, 18 Jan. 1982 at 32. See also "The birth pangs at AT&T's
new unit", Business Week, 14 Dec. 1981 at 28-29; "The odds in a Bell-IBM bout",
Business Week, 25 Jan. 1982 at 22-23; "Stalking New Markets: A slimmer AT&T will
compete fiercely in the world of high technology", Time, 25 Jan. 1982, at 52-55.
59 This point is made with great clarity by Weingast, Regulation, Reregulation, and
Deregulation: the Political Foundations of Agency Clientele Relationships (1981), 44
Law & Contemp. Prob. 147; and Levine, Revisionism Revised? Airline Deregulation
and the Public Interest (1981), 44 Law & Contemp. Prob. 179. One might also argue
that efforts to deregulate natural gas failed, despite the fact that distributional conse-
quences of deregulation would have tended to favour the few, while the costs would
have been borne by the many. This outcome may also be interpreted as contrary to the
predictions of what we have called the interest group model of politics. Examples, con-
sistent with interest group politics, are provided by Levine, id. at 180. See also Acker-
man and Hassler, Clean Coal/DirtyAir (New Haven, Conn.: Yale U. Press, 1981).
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In drawing attention to these anomolies, it is not the authors' intention to
discredit interest group theory, but merely to indicate that it has definite
limits. 60 Clearly, American interest group theory is a powerful tool of political
analysis. It is powerful precisely because the everyday politics of Congress is
interest group politics. 61 Indeed, the general utility of the interest group theory
of congressional politics is so palpable that students of the legislative process
seldom ask why it is that legislators are so responsive to interest group
demands.
C. Party Politics, Efficiency and Macro-economic Performance
Yet, on reflection, it should be equally clear that the responsiveness of
legislators to interest group demands is somewhat problematic. Interest group
theorists generally begin with the assumption that legislators are vote max-
imizers (that is, they behave as if the first rule of politics were to get elected
and the second were to be re-elected). 62 Interest group politics, however, is a
selective process. Perhaps 90 percent of the electorate is outside of the interest
group system. It should be stressed that interest groups are concerned with
issues and policies. Yet most voters pay no attention to, have no knowledge of,
and are unaware of the consequences of particular policies. 63 Consequently, at
6 One-variable theories of the world are attractive in their simplicity, but often
limited in their range of applicability under closer inspection.
61 Ladd argues that "At present the U.S. is doing a simply dreadful job of respond-
ing to special-interest pressures. A structure is in place that guarantees that narrow fac-
tional claims regularly receive preferred treatments over broad public interests." This is
the result of weak political parties, direct legislator-voter contact via television, the large
staffs provided to individual legislators, and the "[proliferation ofl the number of largely
autonomous subcommittees so that virtually every member of the majority could have
his own show." The result is an iron triangle composed of the interest group, the sub-
committee and the relevant federal agency. Ladd concludes that the remedy is to
strengthen political parties that can present "reasonably coherent programs" to the
electorate. See Ladd, "How to Tame the Special-Interest Groups", Fortune, 20 Oct.
1980 at 66-68, 72, 76, 80. But see Weaver, Regulation, social policy and class conflict
(1978), 50 The Pub. Interest 45, for a different view of the "iron triangle" associated
with regulation.
62 The literature on vote maximization is extensive. See, e.g., Downs, supra note
34, passim; Hinich and Ordeshook, Plurality Maximization vs. Vote Maximization
(1970), 64 Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 772; Stigler, Economic Competition and Political Com-
petition (1972), 13 Pub. Choice 91; and Breton, The Economic Theory of Represen-
tative Government (Chicago: Aldine, 1974).
63 The two classic studies of the American voter [Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee,
Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign (Chicago: Chicago
U. Press, 1954); and Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960)]
agree on very little else. On this point, however, there is no debate. Consider the follow-
ing example of the level of voter knowledge. Opinion Research Corporation, on behalf
of LTV Corporation, polled 1003 people between May 14-17, 1981, and asked "How
much have you heard or read about the size and condition of the United States mer-
chant shipping fleet"? The results: 3% had heard or read "a great deal," 13% "a fair
amount," 45% "a little," 38% "nothing at all," and 1% "don't know." Direct federal
subsidies to the industry amount to about $400 million per year. Of the 61% who know"a great deal, a fair amount or a little," 62% favoured federal subsidies and 72%
thought the defence of the country was in some way dependent on the merchant fleet.
See "Should America continue to subsidize its merchant fleet? Two top economists
disagree", Business Week 17 Aug. 1981 at 66-67.
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the macro level, national elections-congressional and presidential-appear to
amount to referenda on the management of the economy. 64 The inference one
might draw from this is that the self-interested legislator ought to be concerned
with the effective management of the economy in general and the efficient per-
formance of government in particular.
That American legislators are quite tolerant of inefficiency in govern-
ment, on the one hand, and responsive to interest group demands, on the
64 This argument was first advanced by Kramer, Short Term Voting Fluctuations in
U.S. Voting Behavior, 1898-1964 (1971), 65 Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 131. Kramer argued
that:
If the performance of the incumbent party is 'satisfactory' according to some
simple standard, the voter votes to retain the incumbent party in office to enable
it to continue its present policies; while if the incumbent's performance is not
'satisfactory', the voter votes against the incumbent... (at 134).
More correctly, Kramer's hypothesis is that election are referenda on the economic per-
formance of the governing party, which implies that voter expectations about future
performance are positively correlated with recent performance. Niskanen, "Economic
and Fiscal Effects on the Popular Vote for the President," in Rae and Eismeier, eds.,
Public Policy and Public Choice (Los Angeles: Sage, 1979) 93, has provided a more
rigorous formulation of the incumbency hypothesis in which voting is characterized as
utility-maximizing behaviour under binary-choice conditions and the individual voter
has a utility function of the following form:
U = a(Y-tX)bXc
in which "Y" is total real family income, "X" is total real federal expenditures, and
"t" is the family share of the present (and future) taxes necessary to finance current
federal expenditures. He will vote for the incumbent, if:
U
U -  R
where "R" is a satisfaction threshold. As Niskanen explains, these two equations
"define a boundary of Y and X values in the election year that are just sufficient to in-
duce him to vote for the candidate of the incumbent party. Other terms in these boun-
dary functions include values of Y and X in some prior year .... and the value of R."
(at 97-99).
These and other studies (see Lepper, Voting Behavior and Aggregate Policy
Targets (1974), 18 Pub. Choice 67 and Tufte, Determinants of the Outcomes of
Midterm Congressional Elections (1975), 69 Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 812) consistently
show that the most powerful predictor of electoral success is the change in real per
capita net national income. These results are not now seriously questioned. However,
the interpretation of these results is still being debated. Stiger, GeneralEconomic Con-
ditions and National Elections (1973), 63 Amer. Econ. Rev. 160, rejects the macro-
economic explanation of political behaviour, and asserts that "the economic basis for
political affiliation must be sought in the area of income redistribution," (at 167).
However, he has not presented empirical support for this assertion. Furthermore,
Niskanen tested Stiger's proposition and found no evidence of a distributional effect on
the popular vote for the President. Indeed, Niskanen suggests that standard cost-benefit
analysis ought to be a sufficient guide for most decisions made by a president seeking re-
election and that it should be, "sufficient to explain most decisions of the Presidency,
except when other groups, such as Congress, on which the President is dependent are
concerned about [distributional] effects" (at 110).
Mann "Elections and Change in Congress," in Mann and Ornstein, eds., The New
Congress (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Inst., 1981) 32. The author rejects
the notion of an economically rational voter, but, citing Jacobson and Kernell in sup-
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other, is largely explained by the system of geographic representation. 5 Fur-
thermore, the consequences of geographic representation are reflected in and
reinforced by the internal organization and decision-making rules of Congress.
Geographic representation results in an orientation toward the specific in-
terests of constituents. One factor is that particular types of economic activity
are geographically concentrated rather than evenly diffused throughout the
nation. Since activities on behalf of efficiency generally produce benefits that
are widely diffused, the direct benefit accruing to the individual legislator con-
cerning such activities tends to be small. That is, the individual legislator can-
not hope to influence the welfare of his constituents in any significant way by
improving the performance of government and the economy in general. What
that person can do is secure benefits for identifiable groups of constituents,
reward supporters, and trade favours with lobbyists. Not surprisingly, that is
for the most part what is done by rational legislators. Indeed, inefficiency in
government offers the enterprising legislator extensive opportunities to pro-
vide highly valued services to influential constituents, by cutting through "red
tape" or obtaining relief from niggling, arbitrary rules or regulations.
66
In addition, there are certain characteristics of the American legislative
process that reinforce the legislators' propensity to respond to interest group
demands. First, party discipline is practically non-existent. On most issues the
norm in Congress is every man (or woman) for himself. Second, legislative
port (Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections (New Haven: Yale U. Press,
forthcoming) ), grants that national economic conditions "shape the climate in which
potential candidates decide to run and donors decide whether to give," (at 45). The
results, however, are the same, as are the incentives to the party leader. Furthermore,
incumbants are evidently aware that this is the case and act accordingly, albeit
sometimes a wrongheaded manner. See Nordhaus, The Political Business Cycle (1975),
42 Rev. of Econ. St. 169 Lindbeck, Stabilization Policy in Open Economies with En-
dogenous Politicians (1976), 66 Amer. Econ. Rev. 1; and Tufte, Political Control of the
Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U. Press, 1978). The interested reader should
also see Niskanen, "Public Policy and the Political Process," in Pejovich, ed., Govern-
mental Controls and the Free Market (College Station, Texas: Texas A & M U. Press,
1976) 73, especially 80-88.
65 See, e.g., Arnold, "The Local Roots of Domestic Policy," in Mann and Ornstein,
eds., supra note 64, at 250 and Fenno, Congressmen in Committees (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1973); Fiorina, Representatives, Roll Calls, and Constituencies (Lexington,
Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974); Fiorina, Congress: Keystone of the Washington
Establishment (New Haven: Yale U. Press, 1977); and Weingast, supra note 59,
especially 150-52. Weingast argues that: Committees and subcommittees dominate the
policy-making process. These institutions limit the political choice possibilities, and thus
play a crucial role in determining the political allocation of resources .... [T]he com-
mittee system divides the legislative responsibilities into separate policy jurisdictions.
Within its policy area, a committee and its members wield disproportionate influence
over policy. This includes a number of special powers such as control over proposals for
new legislation and agency policy oversight.... committee membership is primarily a
self-selection mechanism. Congressmen typically gain influence over policy of direct in-
terest to their district. Because of their differential influence over policy in a given area,
these members exploit their greater influence over the fate of relevant interest groups in
return for electoral support (at 150).
66 See Fiorina and Noll, Majority Rule Models and Legislative Elections (1971), 41
J. of Politics 1081, and Fiorina, supra note 65.
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decision-making is highly decentralized. The everyday business of Congress
takes place in the more than 200 committees and subcommittees, 67 where log-
rolling and vote-trading is highly visible to attentive publics. This means that
the individual legislator can take personal credit for grants made to iden-
tifiable groups by his committee or sub-committee(s). At the same time, it is
equally difficult for legislators to avoid individual responsibility for denying
grants to special interests. 68 Furthermore, as Shepsle has demonstrated, there
is a nearly perfect match between legislators' preferences and committee
assignments; their preferences presumably reflect the special interests of their
constituents. 69 Specialization in Congress, therefore, tends to promote special
interest legislation. Third, with some obvious exceptions, ideological com-
mitments are either weak or widely shared by members of Congress. This
means that most issues are viewed as negotiable.
70
Hence, the granting of favours to special interests, in exchange for
political support, is a characteristic of most legislation. The value of the
favours conferred by regulation, however, is unusually high. 71 If so, this may
be attributable to the haste with which so much of the regulatory legislation
was enacted. This is a particular characteristic of the new social regulation.
72
In the case of direct regulation, it is due to the large amount of discretion
usually granted the regulators. It may also be due to the fact that, where grants
are provided to special interests through regulation, Congress cannot easily or
gracefully withdraw them simply by not appropriating funds to support
everything promised in the authorizing legislation.
67 See, e.g., Jewell and Patterson, The Legislative Process in the United States
(New York: Random House, 1966); Brownson, Congressional Staff Directory (various
years); Davidson, "Subcommittee Government: New Channels for Policy Making," in
Mann and Ornstein, eds., supra note 64, at 99; and Bibby et al., eds., Vital Statistics on
Congress, 1980 (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Inst., 1980).68E.g., it has been suggested that long-serving Congressman Van Deerlin was
defeated in 1980 by the extra funding provided to his Republican opponent by broad-
casting interests who were unhappy with the fact that Van Deerlin allowed his broad-
casting deregulation bill out of his subcommittee.69 Shepsle, The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle (Chicago: U. of Chi. Press, 1977). See also
Ferejohn, Pork BarrelPolitics (Stanford: Stanford U. Press, 1974).
70 See, e.g., Bell, "The Revolution of Rising Entitlements", Fortune, April 1975 at
98-103; Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World,
1955); and Hartz, The Founding of New Societies (New York: Harcourt, Brace &
World, 1964). See also Sinclair, "Coping With Uncertainty: Building Coalitions in the
House and the Senate," in Mann and Ornstein, eds., supra note 64, at 178.
71 In Canada, e.g., Brinkman, Farm Incomes in Canada (Ottawa: ECC and Inst.
for Research on Pub. Pol'y, 1981), who estimates the value of agricultural products
quotas sold through supply management schemes to be about $3 billion in 1980.
72 See Frohnmayer, Regulatory Reform: A Slogan in Search of Substance (1980),
66 A.B.A.J. 871, who cites a study that concludes: "there seems to be something in the
politics of regulatory enactment which mitigates against careful deliberation" (Beam,
The Accidental Leviathan: Was Growth of Government a Mistake? (1979), 5 In-
tergovernmental Perspective 16). See also the papers in Graymer and Thompson, eds.,
Reforming Social Regulation (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 1982) and Lave, The
Strategy of Social Regulation: Decision Frameworks for Policy (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution, 1981).
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In any case, congressional politics is usually interest group politics and in-
terest group politics is inimical to regulatory reform. The Carter Administra-
tion's efforts on behalf of deregulation and regulatory reform, however,
should remind us that the President and the bureaucracy may act on behalf of
the unorganizable many. 73 Furthermore, if the President leads, Congress may
follow. Indeed, when the President is undertaking initiatives that will increase
real output per capita, it is nearly always in the interest of a majority of Con-
gress to follow. Of course, Congress must be persuaded that the President is,
in fact, doing so.
The point is that Presidential politics is party politics. Ultimately, the
perceived performance of government is what party politics is all about. To the
extent that the President is interested in re-election and in the success of his
party, 74 and to the extent that he is oriented toward national elections, he
ought to be interested in promoting allocative efficiency through government
action. As Schattschneider observed some time ago, interest group politics
serves us well only when it is subordinated to and disciplined by the broader
politics of the party. 75 It is not and ought not to be treated as if it were the only,
or even the most important, politics. Unfortunately, this point is frequently
lost on those who are caught up in the day-to-day (interest group) politics of
"business as usual".
The observation that the President has an interest in promoting efficiency
or that executive leadership may overcome interest group politics does not,
however, explain why it is that the Carter Administration promoted deregula-
tion so zealously. Nor does it explain why it was, in several instances, ultimately
successful. And these questions must be answered before we can say whether
the American experience with deregulation is germane to the question of the
political feasibility of regulatory reform in Canada.
D. Explaining American Deregulation
How then does one explain the deregulatory successes in the United
States. It appears that the necessary and sufficient conditions for the success of
the Carter Administration's reform efforts include three factors exogenous to
the political process and three endogenous to it. Based upon Kahn's survey of
the lessons learned from deregulation, the three exogenous factors are the con-
dition of the economy, technological change, and the resurgence of pro-
market ideas. 76
13 See Jones, "Congress and the Presidency," in Mann and Ornstein, eds., supra
note 64, at 223.
'The reported behaviour of Richard Nixon's Committee for the Re-election of the
President in 1976 suggests these were not coincident.
75See Schattschneider, supra note 45 and Goldwin, ed., Political Parties in the
Eighties (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Inst. and Gambier, Ohio: Kenyon
C., 1980).
76 Kahn, "The Political Feasibility of Regulatory Reform: Lessons from Economic
Deregulation," in Graymer and Thompson, eds., supra note 72.
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1. Exogenous Factors
a) Condition of the Economy
The dominant, intractible economic problem of recent years has been
"stagflation", that is, inflation combined with slow growth. 7 Regrettably,
economists do not agree on how best to fight inflation. 78 Indeed, their recom-
mendations are frequently in direct conflict. Yet because the problem is so
salient, government is compelled to take some action or at least be seen to be
taking some action. And even if all economists are not pursuaded that
regulatory reform will reduce inflation, they generally agree that such reform
will make most people better off.7 9 Hence, the American government has
chosen to fight inflation by fighting regulation.80 As Kahn observes:
It was obviously not a coincidence that the deregulations of the last few years
reversed legislation in 1933, 1934, 1935, and 1938-the Banking, Communica-
tions, Motor Carrier and Civil Aviation Acts. Both the governing statutes and the
regulatory philosophy shaping these industries, more or less consistently, for the
following forty-five years were forged during, and by, the Great Depression. Nor
was it a mere coincidence that these deregulations were effected in an era of
stagflation.
81
Kahn's point is that, as a result of stagflation, we have rediscovered the
economics of scarcity. In turn, this has promoted "the application of more
rigorous tests and more efficient techniques to regulatory interventions, as well




According to Kahn, the second exogenous factor that must be considered
if we are to understand the changing climate for regulatory reform is the role
of technology. Of course, the first response to technological change is to try to
contain it by extending the scope and coverage of existing regulation. (McKie,
called this propensity the "tar baby" effect. 83) But technological change may
not be contained indefinitely without subjecting a substantial proportion of
the economy to direct government control.
77 See, e.g., Levi and Kupferman, Slowth (New York: Wiley, 1981).
78See, e.g., Okun, Prices and Quantities: A Macroeconomic Analysis (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981).
79 "Twenty-one of the twenty-three participants [at the Economists' Conference on
Inflation in September 1974] agreed that almost two dozen 'sacred cows' (long standing
and politically unassailable laws and regulations) were having a detrimental effect on
the economy," Domestic Council Review Group on Regulatory Reform, The Challenge
of Regulatory Reform (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov't Printing Office, 1977), at 19-20.
A partial list is given in Thompson, supra note 2 at 193.
80See Thompson and Jones, Fighting Regulation: The Regulatory Review (1980),
23 Cal. Mgt. Rev. 5.81 Kahn, supra note 77.
82 d. See also Thompson, supra note 2, and Thompson, "More and Better
Analysis? The Case of Health, Safety and Environmental Regulation," in Stanbury,
ed., supra note 2, at 239.83 McKie, Social Responsibility and the Business Predicament (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution, 1974) Introduction.
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The power of technology to erode regulatory boundaries is, perhaps, best
illustrated by the communications industry, where it has rendered obsolete the
distinctions drawn by legislators between written and voice communications,
cable and satellite, video and telephone, data processing and communicators.
8 4
c) The Power of Ideas
According to Kahn the third factor deserving our attention is a change in
the American conception of what constitutes "good public policy". Obviously,
in Kahn's view, the condition of the economy and governing economic
philosophies interact very closely. Yet, the recent rediscovery of the virtues of
the market, certainly deserves special mention. 85 Were not a good many
American decision-makers predisposed toward competitive market mecha-
nisms, recognition of the drawbacks and problems associated with regulation
of business might not have resulted in deregulation. Instead, government
decision-makers might have decided that outright public ownership was the
best alternative to present regulations. Indeed, the argument that public
ownership is the only system in which the incompatibility between profit and
'public-values' is resolved is not unheard in the United States. 86 It simply is not
taken very seriously.
2. Endogenous Conditions
The factors mentioned so far may promote a predisposition to regulatory
reform. They do not guarantee it, however. Otherwise the Carter Administra-
tion's successes would have far outweighed its failures in this area. They did
not. Recognition that the Carter Administration had both successes and
84 See, e.g., Irwin, Technology and Telecommunication: A Policy Perspective for
the 80s, Working Paper No. 22 (Ottawa: ECC, 1981); Meyer et al., The Economics of
Competition in the Telecommunications Industry (Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager,
Gunn & Hain, 1980); Janisch and Irwin, Information Technology and Public Policy:
Regulatory Implications for Canada (1982), 20 Osgoode Hall L.J. 610. With respect to
the pressure that technological change has placed upon the regulations of cable televi-
sion in Canada, see Barrett, "Technology outpacing politicians framing communica-
tions laws", The Vancouver Sun, Nov. 3, 1981 at A13, col. 1; editorials in The Globe
and Mail (Toronto): "Pie from the sky", July 8, 1980 at 6, col. 5; "Poor stuff but our
own", July 9, 1980 at 6, col. 5; Lyon, "Meisel message: Stop poaching TV", The
Financial Post, June 7, 1980 at 3 Barratt, "Licence means McGeer's not a pirate", The
Vancouver Sun, June 4, 1980 at A13, col. 1 (and "McGeer scooped on satellite
receivers", June 3, 1980 at A17, col. 1); "He's got the whole world in his dish", The
Globe and Mail (Toronto), June 10, 1980 at 6, col.; "B.C. satellite 'theft' old hat in the
wild", Montreal Gazette, June 4, 1980 at 41, col. 1.; Oake, "TV 'dishes' could cook up
revolt in north", Montreal Gazette, June 4, 1980 at 41, col. 1.
85 One has only to think of the increasing currency of the growing output of the
American Enterprise Inst., the influence of George Gilder, the Hoover Inst., the
Heritage Foundation and the whole body of neo-conservative writing. See Where Do
We Go From Here? Directions from Stage Right a symposium with Wolfe et al., in
(1981), 3 Public Opinion 45; Kristol, Confessions of a True, Self-Confessed-Perhaps
the Only-'Neoconservative' (1979), 2 Public Opinion 50.
86 Contrast Stone, Economic Regulation and the Public Interest: The Federal
Trade Commission in Theory and Practice (Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell U. Press, 1977), with
Katzman, Regulatory Bureaucracy: The Federal Trade Commission and Antitrust
Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980).
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failures,8 7 leads one to ask what factors account for these different outcomes.
Here, three factors endogenous to the political process appear to be particularly
significant: presidential leadership, the attention of Congress, and compelling
evidence that regulatory reform is in the public interest.
a) Presidential Leadership
Someone must initiate the process of regulatory reform, and Congress
cannot and will not.88 On the other hand, we have also claimed the President
has an interest in promoting economic efficiency-and good macro-economic
performance-in general. Under appropriate circumstances, that interest im-
plies a particular interest in regulatory reform.
8 9
It is not sufficient, however, for the President to announce that he is in
favour of regulatory reform, to order the bureaucracy to regulate better, more
smartly, or to shrink in size. Nor is it enough to "twist a few arms", or
"reason together", on behalf of regulatory reform legislation. Effective
leadership must ultimately be aimed at the lawmakers in Congress. The Presi-
dent must adopt a plan of attack, including a list of targets and their priority,
and a plan of persuasion. So far as the Carter Administration was successful,
its success reflects a sequential attack on a limited number of targets, for ex-
ample, airline deregulation and then trucking. Its failures reflect, to a degree,
87This is not to say that individual Congressmen have not introduced a large
number of regulatory reform bills. Very, very few have been enacted. See, for example,
Regulatory Reform: A Survey of Proposals in the 94th Congress (Washington, D.C.:
American Enterprise Inst., 1976); Regulation and Regulatory Reform: A Survey of Pro-
posals of the 95th Congress (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Inst., 1978); Ma-
jor Regulatory Initiatives during 1978 (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise
Inst., 1978); Government Regulation: Proposals for Procedural Reform (Washington,
D.C.: American Enterprise Inst., 1979); and Major Regulatory Initiatives During 1979
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Inst., 1980); Major Regulatory Initiatives
during 1980 (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Inst., 1981). See also the articles
by Senator Ribicoff and Representative Brown in (1979), 3 Regulation 17, 20.
"See especially Weingast, supra note 59. The President proposes; the Congress
disposes. It has been argued that Jimmy Carter sought a direct link with the American
people. See Polsby, "Interest Groups and the Presidency: Trends in Political In-
termediation in America" in Burnham and Weinburg, eds., American Politics and
Public Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1978) 41. Polsby states at 44:
The main vehicle by which presidents bypass interest groups and reach the people
"directly" is the medium of television, supplemented by the major wire services,
news magazines, and other national news publications. Ample experience,
however, as well as the formal findings of research, has shown that these news
media are anything but neutral transmission belts. Rather, obeying their own
organizational imperatives, craft norms, fashions, and accepted practices, the news
media select and transform events. Politicians gain and lose from these processes of
selection and transformation.
89 Wildavsky and Knott, "Jimmy Carter's Theory of Governing," in Burnham and
Weinberg, eds., id. 55 at 60 provide evidence for the conclusion that:
Part of Carter's political theory, then, is to change everything at once. Comprehen-
sive change enables one both to identify the public interest by considering the
merits of opposing claims and to .serve that interest by making opponents fight on
all fronts simultaneously, thus diluting their forces while concentrating one's own.
The bigger the change, the greater the public attention-and the more likely it
becomes that the public interest will prevail over private interests.
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an inability to concentrate the resources of the Presidency on a limited number
of high priority issues or to maintain a consistent definition of what he wanted
done.
90
One of the main lessons to be learned from the successes and failures of
the Carter Administration is that appointments to regulatory bodies matter a
great deal. If the President appoints advocates of special interests-business,
labour, consumers, the environment, to name a few-to senior policy-making
positions in regulatory agencies, the agency in question will protect those in-
terests. Economists, on the other hand, are advocates of efficiency. Conse-
quently, where the President wants efficiency, he should probably appoint
economists 91 -they are the "shock troops" with which to fight the battles of
deregulation.
Close scrutiny of the role played by Kahn 92 and Bailey93 in achieving
airline deregulation, or Gaskins94 in promoting greater competition in the sur-
face freight industry, leads us to conclude that their major accomplishments
lay in stimulating Congress to take legislative action. 95
b) Getting The Attention of Congress
In the case of both airline and trucking deregulation a substantial number
of legislators and particularly legislative leaders became sufficiently interested
in understanding the issue to pay attention to the arguments made on both
90 In the case of natural gas and deregulation, President Carter apparently changed
his mind as to what he wanted done. See Malbin, supra note 56.
91 Note that this is not because economists are wiser or smarter than other
people. Quite the contrary, economists are valuable in this context precisely because
they have an intense, often irrational commitment to market mechanisms and to effi-
ciency. Their faith may not be naive, but it is certainly touching.
92 See Kahn, Applications of Economics to an Imperfect World (1979), 69
American Econ. Rev.; and his speech to the New York Society of Security Analysts
printed in "Kahn Urging CAB Deregulation", Aviation Wk & Space Tech. 6 Mar. 1978
at 35-42.
93 See Kahn, id.; Levine, supra note 59; Weingast, supra note 59; and Breyer, infra
note 100. See also Bailey, "Deregulation and Regulatory Reform of U.S. Air-
Transportation Policy," in Mitchell and Kleindorfer, eds., Regulated Industries and
Public Enterprise (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1980) 29; Derthick and Quirk, "The
Politics of Deregulation: A Preliminary Report," paper presented at the American
Political Science Association (APSA) meetings, New York (Sept. 4, 1981); Brown,
"The Politics of Civil Air Transportation Deregulation," paper presented at APSA
meeting, New York (Sept. 4, 1981); and Behrman, "Civil Aeronautics Board," in
Wilson, ed., The Politics of Regulation (New York: Basic Books, 1980).
14 See Graymer and Thompson, "Conclusion," in Graymer and Thompson eds.,
supra note 72.
91 We should emphasize that the body of research on airline regulation (including
the work of Caves, Jordan, Levine, Keeler, Miller and Douglas-see note 100, infra)
prior to the Kennedy Committee hearings in 1975 was most helpful in convincing Con-
gress to pass the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 USC § 1301. Such research provided
much useful ammunition for the advocates of reform. A useful history of the process of
reform can be found in Behrman, supra note 93 at 91. See also Ellison, Deregulation:
The U.S. Airline Experience (Ottawa: unpublished paper on the Regulation Reference,
EEC, 1980); and Bailey, supra note 93.
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sides. 96 Where the issue remained relegated to a handful of committee
members and their staff (for example, the 1977 Clean AirAct Amendments),
97
legislative outcomes were dominated by business as usual, interest group
politics. As noted above, this meant that substantive reform was very unlikely.
The results were as expected (that is, special interest legislation favouring the
Eastern producers of dirty coal).
Given that it is a scarce and valuable commodity, how did Kahn and his
people at the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), and later Gaskins at the In-
terstate Commerce Commission (ICC), get the attention of Congress? They
started by making the deregulation issue politically visible. They did this by
promoting competition (price and entry) to the extent permitted by the most
liberal interpretation of their legislative charter. The statutes governing direct
regulation usually permit a large amount of discretion. In the case of the CAB,
all fare proposals, within a "zone of reasonableness", were automatically ac-
cepted. In addition, airlines were freely granted access to new routes and given
the authority to drop existing ones. 98 This not only captured the attention of
the press, but also indicated to potential supporters the kind of magnitude of
benefits that would flow from airline deregulation. By interesting the press
and, perhaps, by over-reaching his statutory authority, thereby challenging
Congress, Kahn and the CAB, and later Gaskins and the ICC, captured the at-
tention of the legislators.
96 See Levine, supra note 59 at 193-94:
In the executive and administrative contexts, Robson and the Ford administration
began the process of educating Congress and the public to the ills produced by
airline regulation and to the potential benefits of deregulation. Senator Kennedy
gave the process major impetus in the Senate through the 1975 hearings before his
subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure. Certainly the industry
opposed deregulation, as did many members of Congress and the public, and this
opposition was reflected in the timidity of the CAB's early efforts as well as in the
restrained tone of early legislative proposals. But at least some of the industry and
public opposition, and much of the congressional skepticism, stemmed from uncer-
tainty about the effects of dismantling a system that had produced at least minimally
satisfactory results for forty years .... [T]he demonstrable price and service benefits
of California and Texas intrastate experiments with competition were probably in-
dispensible to the task of persuading skeptics that the apparently satisfactory CAB-
regulated system, in fact, was not functioning in the public interest.
But the telling fact for our purposes is that this initially doubtful congressional
faction (including Senator Cannon, the powerful chairman of both the Aviation
Subcommittee and the full Commerce Committee) ultimately helped control the
legislative process in favour of deregulation, which by then was perceived to be in
the public interest. And it did so in the face of diehard opposition by factions (in-
cluding the industry) whose positions were undermined by the ultimate transparency
of the degree to which their positions were motivated by purely private, rather than"public interest" considerations of gain and loss. And, on the administrative side,
even conceding that Chairman Kahn and his chief staff aides had relatively little to
lose by the diminution of CAB power, these changes were supported by an initially
skeptical but ultimately convinced career staff and by members of the Board who
were prepared to see their own power diminished for the benefit of the public.
97 See Ackerman and Hassler, supra note 59.98 See, e.g., the Transcontinental Low-Fare Route Proceeding; Chicago-Midway
Low-Fare Route Proceeding and the Oakland Service Case. These are described in
Behrman, supra note 93 and Bailey, supra note 93.
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c) Compelling Evidence that Reform was in the Public Interest
Having obtained the attention of Congress, it was then necessary for
Kahn and Gaskins to persuade Congress to deregulate. How did they do it?
Here the story of airline deregulation is particularly instructive.
First, staff economists in the administration and "on the hill" were able,
on the basis of a substantial body of empirical research,99 to show the adverse
effects of regulation and to characterize the consequences of deregulation in
such a way as to strengthen the political coalition in its favour. Supporters of
airline deregulation, for example, repeatedly explained that price and entry
regulation in the domestic airline industry had raised consumer prices well
above what they would have been had price and entry been determined by the
market and as Breyer has observed, "lower prices" are far more arresting than
"more efficient use of aircraft.' 1°° Furthermore, this explanation was sup-
ported by highly plausible evidence. According to Wilson:
If there was a single fact that was of crucial significance in making persuasive the
argument that price and entry regulation had adverse effects on consumers, it was
the comparison of rates charged by unregulated airlines (for example, those link-
ing San Francisco and Los Angeles) with those charged by regulated interstate
airlines (for example, those connecting Boston and Washington, D.C.). Even so it
was necessary to look carefully for other factors besides regulation that might have
affected prices (there were some, but they were not decisive). 101
The apparent value of this further research should also be stressed. It was
needed to explain both the original justification for regulating the industry and
the'objective it came to serve; to understand the position of the major actors
associated with industry and the effects deregulation would have on their posi-
tions, that is, to identify winners and losers; and, because "the detailed in-
vestigation [was] itself necessary, to convince others that the proponents of
reform [were] serious, thorough, and [had] made their case." 102 This last point
reflects one of the key tenets of the rhetoric of persuasion.
The fact is that people are seldom persuaded by others they persuade
themselves. 103 But before they can persuade themselves, they must first hear
99See, e.g., Jordan, Airline Regulation in America: Effects and Imperfections
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U. Press, 1970); Levine, Is Regulation Necessary? Califor-
nia Air Transportation and National Regulatory Policy (1965), 74 Yale L.J. 1416;
Keeler, Airline Regulation and Market Performance (1972), 3 Bell J. Econ. Mgt. Sci.
399; Douglas and Miller, Economic Regulation of Domestic Air Transport: Theory and
Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1974).
100 Breyer, "The Genesis of Airline Deregulation: The Role of the Kennedy Hear-
ings and Report," paper presented at the National Conference on Airline Regulation,
sponsored by The Inst. for Research on Pub. Pol'y and the American Enterprise Inst.,
Ottawa (June 27, 1979). See also Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches,
Less Restrictive Alternatives, andReform (1977), 92 Harv. L. Rev. 547.
101 Wilson, The Dead Hand of Regulation(1971), 25 The Pub. Interest 39.
102 Breyer, supra note 100 at 4:
103 Eastern Airlines has recently taken out full page ads in Business Week (cf. 22
June 1981) in which its president Frank Borman states, "When Congress wanted to
deregulate the airlines, I wasn't sure Eastern could survive. I was wrong. Because I
underestimated the people of Eastern ... There may be more competition, but we're a
much better airline than before."
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the argument. An argument is much more likely to be heard if it is presented
by a serious, competent, considerate, and reliable source. Often the best way
to be heard is to listen. The best way to discover what it will take to persuade
someone is to ask. That the supporters of airline deregulation were willing and
able to pursue each new challenge as it was raised showed that they were listen-
ing. In time this meant that they were to be taken seriously and that their
arguments were eventually found to be credible.
Last, it was necessary for the advocates of reform to do more than show
that regulation was inefficient. Proponents of deregulation had to develop a
plan that appeared "practical and fair to allow a transition from the regulated
regimne to the new system." 104
In contrast, one would observe that reform of the new social regulations
has not attracted the attention of the press or of Congress. 105 It is probably
true that increased efficiency and regulation in general, are not, in the
abstract, very scintillating issues. Perhaps proponents of incentive mechanisms
ought to pay more attention to characterizing the consequences of reform in
4 Breyer, supra note 101, at 7. Potential "losers" (small cities who lost service
and employees who lost their jobs) were provided with a "safety net" in the form of a
direct subsidy programme. To date, the amounts expended have been far less than
anticipated.
105 On the Reagan administration's efforts on the deregulation front see, for exam-
ple, "Deregulation: A fast start for the Reagan strategy", Business Week, 9 Mar. 1981
at 62-67; "The Administration's power play at the NRC [Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion]", Business Week, 22 June 1981 at 37; "No bonanza in offshore oil", Business
Week, 8 June 1981 at 124, 126; "A new route for decontrolling gas", Business Week,
29 June 1981 at 50; "OSHA's latest recall of Carter era rules", Business Week, 27 April
1981 at 48; "The FCC: on a new wavelength", Business Week, 25 May 1981 at 172;
"Toppling a pillar of U.S. labor law [the Davis-Bacon Act]", Business Week, 1 June
1981 at 38; "The new bias on hiring rules", Business Week, 25 May 1981 at 123, 127;
"Less zeal for change in Shad's new SEC", Business Week, 18 May 1981 at 49-50;
"ICC nominations: A new deregulation test", Business Week, 20 July 1981 at 58;
"Watt tries an end run on offshore oil leases", Business Week, 20 July 1981 at 55-56;
"Testing the Fed on bank mergers", Business Week, 6 July 1981 at 84; "For deregula-
tion, a detour-not a roadblock [June 17 decision of the Supreme Court on the cotton
dust case]", Business Week, 6 July 1981 at 26; "Deregulating AT&T at last?", Business
Week, 3 Aug. 1981 at 68; "Letting utilities charge now and generate later", Busi-
ness Week, 3 Aug. 1981 at 23; "Reagan's shift on gas decontrol", (editorial), Business
Week, 27 July 1981 at 99; "Bank deregulation will not be a cure-all", Business Week,
27 July 1982 at 28-29; "An itchy Congress moves on bank reform", Business Week, 13
July 1981 at 24-26; "U.S. notes Canadian objection to lowered clean-air standards",
The Citizen (Ottawa), June 25, 1981 at 10 col. 1; "U.S. eliminates last controls on oil
prices", The Globe and Mail (Toronto), Jan. 29, 1981 at B7, col. 1; "Friction over free-
ing bus lines", Business Week, 2 Feb. 1981 at 78; "FCC chairman pursues television
deregulation", Globe and Mail (Toronto), June 13, 1981 at B5, col. 6; "Gas decontrol
looks more like a winner", Business Week, 31 Aug. 1981 at 48-49; "Senate Plan to
Deregulate Broadcasting is Trimmed, but Kept Alive, by Conferees", Wall Street Jour-
nal, July 28, 1981 at 6, col. 1; "The White House Reins in the ICC's Taylor", Business
Week, 28 Sept. 1981 at 135, col. 2; "The shocks ahead as gas prices play catch-up",
Business Week, 28 Sept. 1981 at 123-24, 127. For a critique, see Crandall, Has Reagan
Dropped the Ball (1981), 5 Regulation 15; Guzzardi, "Reagan's Reluctant Deregulators",
Fortune, 8 March 1982 at 34, and the articles by several authors in (1982), 6 Regulation
15.
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attention-grabbing terms, for example, saving the American auto industry. 106
More important is the fact that, unlike Kahn or Gaskins, policy-makers in the
social regulatory agencies have not, so far, sought by their actions to direct the
attention of Congress to issues of substantive reform. 107
Even if they could get the attention of Congress, however, it is not ob-
vious that the proponents of incentive mechanisms are prepared to persuade
Congress to follow their advice. To a considerable degree the kind of hard,
credible evidence available for use by the advocates of airline deregulation, for
example, is not available to those who wish to redirect the new social regula-
tion. To cite examples of effective alternatives to existing regulatory regimes,
the proponents of incentive mechanisms must draw on examples from outside
the United States; from Great Britain or Scandinavia, as critics of the Food
and Drug Administration do;10 8 from Canada, as supporters of accident taxes
can; 109 or from Europe, 110 as supporters of effluent fees must. Unfortunately,
these examples are by the very fact of their foreignness unfamiliar and suspect
to Americans. Finally, supporters of alternatives to current methods of regula-
tion are not now able to put forward detailed, practical implementation plans.
Faced with the costs of change and uncertain benefits, most people, including
legislators, prefer to stay with the devil they know.
106 See, e.g., Niskanen, "Current Practices and Possible Alternatives to Automo-
bile Safety, Emissions and Fuel Economy Regulations," in Graymer and Thompson,
eds., supra note 72.
107 See, e.g., the useful discussion by Bardach, "Reason, Responsibility, and the
New Social Regulation," in Burnham and Weinberg, eds., supra note 88, at 364. A
valuable review of the Reagan administration's actions on the regulatory reform front is
contained in Hennigan, "Politics of Regulatory Analysis," paper delivered at the An-
nual Meeting of the American Political Sci. Assoc., New York (September 4, 1981).
One of President Reagan's first official acts was to establish the Task Force on
Regulatory Relief chaired by the Vice President. He also issued Executive Order 12291
on February 17, 1981 designed to centralize review of all major regulations in the Ex-
ecutive Office of the President. See the analysis in (1981), 5 Regulation 15.
lOBSee, e.g., Lasagna, "International Drug Regulation," (AEI reprint No. 73
Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Inst., 1977); Wardell, ed., Controlling the Use
of Therapeutic Drugs: An International Comparison (Washington, D.C.: American
Enterprise Inst., 1978); Helms, ed., Drug Development and Marketing (Washington,
D.C.: American Enterprise Inst., 1975); Helms, ed., The International Supply of
Medicines: Implications for U.S. Regulatory Reform (Washington, D.C.: American
Enterprise Inst., 1980). In the area of occupational health and safety see Kelman,
Regulating America, Regulating Sweden: A Comparative Study of Occupational Safety
and Health Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981).
109 Manga, Broyles and Reschenthaler, Occupational Health and Safety: Issues and
Alternatives, Technical Report No. 6 (Ottawa: ECC, 1981); and Reschenthaler, Oc-
cupational Health and Safety in Canada: The Economics and Three Case Studies (Mon-
treal: The Inst. for Research on Pub. Pol'y, 1979).
110 See, e.g., Kneese and Bauer, Managing Water Quality: Economics, Technology,
Institutions (Washington, D.C.: Johns Hopkins U. Press, 1968); Stephenson, ed., The
Practical Application of Economic Incentives to the Control of Pollution (Vancouver:
U. of B.C. Press, 1977) chs. 1, 6; and Bower et al., Incentives in Water Quality Manage-
ment: France and the RuhrArea (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1981).
111 These words are taken from the Communiqu6 of the First Ministers following
their conference on the economy Feb. 15-16, 1978. See Responsible Regulation, supra
note 1 at xii.
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III. THE PROSPECTS FOR REGULATORY REFORM IN CANADA
In this section of the paper we propose to apply Kahn's model of
regulatory reform to Canada. In doing so the important differences in govern-
mental structure, values, and history between Canada and the United States
are taken into account.
A. Exogenous Factors
1. Condition of the Economy
In our view, the concerns expressed in Canada about "the burden of
government regulation on the private sector.., and the burden of overlapping
federal and provincial jurisdictions ... [in terms of its effects] on jobs and
costs .... M" is not simply an expression of concern for the size and scope or
the growth of government.112 Rather it seems to be a response to "stagflation"
in the Canadian economy. When the rate of real growth per capita declines
and the conventional levers of monetary and fiscal policy have not been effec-
tive, the search for the "villains" and potential remedies is widened.
Therefore, we interpret the Canadian expressions of concern about regulation
by politicians as an effort (albeit largely symbolic) to economize on govern-
ment in the face of poor macro-economic performance. 
113
We would emphasize that neither the absolute level of macro perform-
ance, nor even Canada's performance compared to other Western industrialized
nations, is the central question. What matters is performance in relation to the
expectations held by the public. To a considerable degree, politicians, par-
ticularly those at the federal level, have created high expectations. It is far
more than a matter of "a chicken in every pot". Wants have become needs;
subsequently elevated to rights. The expectation of a continually rising standard
of living (in terms of real consumption) has become almost universal.
This expectation was not met in the late 1970s in Canada. In 1978, 1979
and 1980 real wages fell by 3.0, 1.6 and 1.1% respectively. Indeed, over the en-
tire period 1974-80 real wages increased at an average rate of only 1.0%. The
12The ECC points out that between 1971 and 1975 expenditures by all levels of
government amounted to 45.1% of GNP. In the next five year period (1976-80) the frac-
tion increased to 49.5%. See Eighteenth Annual Review 1981: Room for Manoevre (Ot-
tawa: Min. of Supply and Services Can., 1981) at 22. "Tax expenditures" have also
grown enormously so that by 1979 the value of federal personal income tax expenditure
benefits, $13.8 billion, is only slightly smaller than the amount actually collected, $17.0
billion. (Department of Finance, Analysis of Federal Tax Expenditures for Individuals
(Ottawa: n. pub., 1981), Table 1). Vining and Botterell indicate that 48% of the 233
provincial corporations in existence in 1980 were created since 1970 and 76% were
established since 1960. The assets of such corporations amount to $62.3 billion as com-
pared to $50.7 billion for federal Crown corporations. (Vining and Botterell, "An
Overview of the Origins, Growth, Size, and Functions of Provincial Crown Corpora-
tions," in Prichard, ed., Crown Corporations in Canada: The Calculus of Instrument
Choice (Toronto: Butterworths, forthcoming).
3 A very useful brief discussion of Canada's economic performance in the 1970's
can be found in the Eighteenth AnnualReview, supra note 113, at ch. 1. Recall also that
the federal Budget of November 1981 was withdrawn and replaced by another one in
June 1982. At that time the federal deficit for 1982/83 was estimated to be $19.6 billion,
up from $10 billion seven months earlier.
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Consumer Price Index (CPI) over the same period increased at a rate of 9.3%
per year. 114
Canada's unemployment rate between 1973 and 1980 averaged 7.0%.
Even in the United Kingdom, no paragon of macro-economic management,
the comparable rate was 5.0%. We must note, however, that Canada's
performance on the inflation dimension over the same period (9.3°01) was far
better than that of the United Kingdom (15.1%) and Italy (16.0%) and only
slightly worse than that of the United States (9.1%). Between 1974 and 1980
the "Discomfort Index" in Canada (the sum of the unemployment rate and
the CPI) fell below 16% in only one year (1976) and in 1978 and 1980 it was
17.30 and 17.7% respectively.
Between 1973 and 1980 real GNP grew at 3.3% per year-a rate exceeded
only by Japan in the six countries compared. However, much of this growth
was directly attributable to the high rate of growth of the labour force. Total
employment increased at an average annual rate of 3.1% as compared with
-0.4% in Germany for example. Canadian productivity was the lowest among
the seven countries compared. It was 0.2% as compared with 3.1% in Ger-
many, 2.7% in France and even 2.2% in Italy. We note the fact that in 1974,
1975, 1979 and 1980 Canadian productivity was negative.
2. Technological Change
At the present time, it appears that technological change as a
"deregulator" is most applicable in the telecommunications (including broad-
casting) sector. Technological change may ultimately render futile attempts by
the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission to regu-
late Canadian exposure to non-Canadian content.115 In the era of broadcasting
satellite transmissions and cheap, individual home signal recovery, it will be as
difficult to preserve national boundaries as it is to preserve artifical boundaries
between kinds of communications. 
116
In a country in which a wide variety of types of protectionism flourishes it
is heartening to see a major regulated enterprise advocate a reduction in the
scope of regulation. B.C. Tel has recently proposed to the CRTC that:
In the case of multi-line business equipment.., all activities beyond the demarca-
tion point of the local switched telephone network are appropriately attributable
to and the responsibility of the owner or competitive supplier of each specific in-
stallation. In the case of the single-line business and residential equipment.., in a
setting of a new monopoly boundary the ultimate degree of competition should be
the same as multi-line equipment. 117
114 These data and those cited in the following three paragraphs were obtained from
Department of Finance, The Current Economic Situation and Prospects for the Cana-
dian Economy in the Short andMedium Term (Ottawa, n. pub., 1981) at 4, 5, 16, 18.
's See, for example, Consultative Committee on the Implications of Telecom-
munications for Canadian Sovereignty, Telecommunications and Canada (Ottawa:
Min. of Supply and Services Can., 1979) and Committee on Extension of Service to
Northern and Remote Communities, The 1980s: A Decade of Diversity, Broadcasting,
Satellites and Pay-T. V. (Ottawa: CRTC, Min. of Supply and Services Can., 1980).
116 See note 84, supra.
117 "Argument of British Columbia Telephone Company" in proceedings before
the CRTC with respect to the attachment of subscriber-provided terminal equipment,
filed Jan. 18, 1982, mimeo at 6-7.
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B.C. Tel has argued that with terminal interconnection, "price regulation
must be limited to the monopoly services" and that the telephone companies
must be allowed to compete under the same rules applicable to all
competitors.118 The company also argues that with the silicon chip and more
than a decade of experience in the United States interconnecting companies
will be able to offer innovation and competition with the telephone companies.
In particular, B.C. Tel is concerned that its competitors will have competitive
flexibility while it will be subject to regulatory constraints in the provision of
non-monopoly services.1 19
A kind of "demonstration effect" spillover may also operate where the
United States deregulates and Canada does not. For example, whether the
Canada Transport Commission deregulates commercial air travel or not, Air
Canada and CP Air must respond to competitive pressure from American
airlines.120 It will be extremely difficult for Air Canada to maintain a fare of
$106.00 between Toronto and New York when Peoples Express Airlines
charges $U.S. 23.00, off peak or $U.S. 35.00 during the week to fly between
Buffalo and New York or a fare of $302.00 between Vancouver and New York
when Continental's ASAP fare from Seattle is $178.00.121
There is no doubt that the process of deregulating the United States'
airlines put substantial pressure on Canadian regulators, carriers and govern-
ment policy-makers. 122 The demonstrated benefits of deregulation in the
United States gave ammunition to the advocates of less regulation in Canada.
The liberalization of trucking and railway regulations in the United States
has led industry observers to believe that there will be a new environment for
transborder transportation. American trucks will seek to enter the Canadian
market and offer intermodal truck-rail service. Canadian shippers could use
trucks to get their goods to American border cities and then establish contract
agreements with American railroads to ship their goods east or west. At the
same time, efficient Canadian trucking firms will seek to enter the United
States market, for example, by eliminating American "bridging" carriers and
offering through service from major Canadian cities to major American
centres. 123
3. The Power of Ideas
There are important differences between the attitudes of Canadians and
Americans toward the role of government in the economy. Presthus, who has
118 "Evidence-in-Chief of British Columbia Telephone Company" submitted to the
CRTC in the Bell Canada-Attachment of Subscriber-Provided Terminal Equipment,
June 5, 1981, mimeo at 66.
19 Id. at 67, 68.
120 The importance of transborder operations to Canadian carriers is described in
Jordan, Performance of Regulated Canadian Airlines in Domestic and Transborder
Operations (a study prepared for the Bureau of Competition Policy, Department of
Consumer and Corporate Affairs, July 1981, mimeo).
121 See "Upstarts in the Sky: Here comes a new kind of airline", Business Week, 15
June 1981 at 78-92.
122 See Reschenthaler and Stanbury, supra note 6.
123 See Romain, "Opportunities, problems seen in U.S. deregulation", The Globe
and Mail (Toronto), June 19, 1981 at B-2, col. 1; "Motorways ready to roll into U.S.
Markets", Financial Post, July 18, 1981 at W-8, col. 1.
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studied the political culture of several nations, describes elements of Canada's
attitude in the following terms: "a pragmatic appreciation of government's
role in the economy; an underlying corporatist theory of societal life; tradi-
tional and deferential patterns of authority; and a quasi-participative political
culture insofar as the ordinary citizen is concerned." 124 Presthus defines
"pragmatic" as "an essentially utilitarian conception of government which
provides a justification for its use to support economic development and to
cushion the shocks of the marketplace." 125 He stresses that in English Canada,
a "radical spirit of laissezfaire or fear of government which might have been
assumed to characterize... most of those engaged in commerce and industry,
rarely seems to have taken hold. .. ." 126 In contrast, the United States' politi-
cal culture emphasizes individualism, the institutionalized dispersion of
power-including that held by governments, pluralism, and participation in
public life.
Contrast between the recent directions of Canadian and American
policies is provided by a Harris survey released late in March 1981 and by
Canadian pollster Goldfarb's recent soundings of public opinion. Harris
found strong support for the Reagan Administration's proposition that
Americans want less government. Harris found a significant shift in the







Martin Goldfarb's survey of Canadian public opinion has revealed that most
people believe government is too big and too powerful. There is significant
sensitivity to expenditures. "They think taxes are too high ..... ,128 At the same
time, Goldfarb emphasizes, "It is naive to think, however, that citizens will do
with less service. They do not want less medicare, less education, less police
protection, or slower service from External Affairs. They only want less serv-
ice for others, but not for them. If restraint ends up meaning less service to the
middle class, citizens will tilt and reject." 129 So while Americans say they want
to cut back on government in a number of dimensions, Canadians want to
change its direction, says Goldfarb. They want government spending brought
under control but they also want "more government involvement as a means
of providing a better life." In summary, "the reality is that all economic
regions of the country and all political perspectives endorse big govern-
ment." 130 People want better government, to deal with real problems.




127 As quoted in Keene, Snapshots (1981), 4 Pub. Opinion 58 at 60.
18 Goldfarb, "The Public's View of Government Restraint," in Aucoin, ed., supra
note 20 at 65.
129id. at 70.
130 Id. at 71.
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Even Canadian conservatives strive to distinguish themselves from
American neo-conservatism. For example, a senior advisor to the premier of
Ontario has recently argued that:
conservatism should stand not just for freedom but also for responsibility-per-
sonal and economic-for the rest of society. In our nation, the Tory mainstream
embraces the pragmatic vision of the first prime minister we ever had, Sir John A.
Macdonald and the humanity and social compassion of the best prime minister we
never had in the Hon. Robert Stanfield. It has resisted pressures to limit its breadth
or be reduced to a mere carbon copy of the American Conservative stream, which
is sporadically both overstocked and overfished. 131
He went on to say that he had little use for U.S. neo-conservatism as expounded
by "theologians and ideologues" such as Kristol and Friedman. "Those who
intellectualize greed and selfishness as self-proclaimed prophets of the new
conservatism in the States, do the best of American conservatism and the
traditions which span both Lincoln and Eisenhower a great disservice." 1
32
Despite economic adversity Canadians have not swung to the political
right. In fact, a survey of 3000 Canadians in the fall of 1981 indicates that "the
Canadian people have a deep commitment to liberal [human rights]
policies." 133 Ninety percent agreed with a woman's right to equal pay for equal
work; 69 percent supported affirmative action hiring programs for women and
minorities "to make up for their lack of opportunities in the past"; 97 percent
agreed (11 percent with some qualifications) to legislation to protect the rights
of the disabled, while almost two-thirds agreed there should be protection of
homosexuals from discrimination in employment. 134.
If by regulatory reform it is meant that the existing amount of govern-
ment action by way of regulation is to be reduced or even that the rate of
growth of regulatory initiatives is to be reduced, it seems clear that such a
change would be, in historical terms, uncharacteristic of Canadians. Com-
pared to Americans, for example, Canadians have more frequently looked to
their governments to take a strong role in economic development through the
use of subsidies, taxes, and the direct provision of goods and services,
135 to
maintain a sense of cultural or national identity in the face of fundamental
economic forces that contradict such desires, 36 to restrict market forces
131 Quoted in "Davis ignoring trend: MPP", The Globe and Mail (Toronto), Feb.
2, 1982 at 2, col. 4.
132. Id.
133 Crawford, "Canadians not moving to right study", Toronto Star, Dec. 18, 1981
at A-18, col. 1.
134At the same time, almost 60% of the sample wanted to keep film censorship
boards and 62% supported retention of the War Measures Act R.S.C. 1970 c. W-2 in-
voked in 1970 against the alleged threat of the FLQ in Quebec. (Id. at A-1 8, col. 4).
IM-See, e.g., Brady, "The State and Economic Life," in Brown, ed., Canada (Los
Angeles: U. of California Press, 1950).
J_' g 36See, e.g., "Defensive Expansionism: The State and Economic Growth in
Canada," in Easterbrook and Watkins, eds., Approaches to Canadian Economic
History (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1967) and Babe, Canadian Television
Broadcasting Structure, Performance and Regulation (Ottawa: ECC, Min. of Supply
and Services Can., 1979). The Report to the Royal Commission on Corporate Concen-
tration (Ottawa: Min. of Supply and Services Can., 1978) at 397-98 notes:
[A] complex network of tariffs, subsidies and other forms of economic control...
have made the Canadian economy a highly artificial one.... A high level of state
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(domestic and international) so as to provide a less risky environment for
Canadian firms and individuals, 137 and to achieve consensus and co-ordination
of contending private or public sector efforts in order to avoid "waste and
duplication".
Regulatory reform would appear to require that Canadians increase their
belief in the efficacy of competitive market forces as opposed to the ability of
government officials (regulators) to plan, co-ordinate, and control the actions
of both privately and publicly-owned entreprises; accept the fact that certain
market failures are more costly (in social terms) to correct by government
regulation than they are to tolerate; and recognize that much regulation is aimed
at protecting and enhancing the position of producer groups at the expense of
unorganized, diffuse consumer groups. In historical terms, such a shift in
belief seems unlikely.1
38
Moreover, compared to Americans, Canadians tend to be less enamoured
of the putative benefits of competition. "There does not exist in Canada any
fundamental belief in the virtues of competition as a method of allocating
scarce resources ... our more structured, authoritarian society takes business
power for granted." 13 9 Hardin, for example, argues that Canada is a monopoly
culture:
In Canada, in key sectors of the economy, monopoly has meant efficiency and
market competition has meant pernicious waste. Monopoly is the economic
model. Monopoly suits us, and always has. We have an aptitude for monopoly, in
a world where monopoly, with a dynamic beyond competition, is coming into its
own as a creative entrepreneurial form. Yet being in trall to the colonial ideology,
we force unnatural and contrived competition on ourselves. We cannot accept our
monopoly culture because others won't accept it for us. 140
In other words, this author perceives Canadians' anti-competitive instincts as a
virtue. Deregulating industries in which prices and entry are regulated implies
a reliance on competition as a method of social control that is uncharacteristic
of Canadians.
intervention may well be the sine qua non of Canadian nationhood .... However,
so long as Canada continues to exist in defiance of economics, economics must
often take place to considerations that are not measurable in terms of economic
efficiency.
137 One has only to look at the Department of Transport's latest Discussion Paper,
"Proposed Domestic Air Carrier Policy (Unit Toll Services)" released Aug. 14, 1981.
See "Pepin unveils proposals for strict domestic airline policy", The Globe and Mail
(Toronto), Aug. 15, 1981 at B-7, col. 1. See also Harrison, "Chosen instruments of
public policy," Financial Post, July 18, 1981 at 1, col. 2; and "Beef producers gather to
push marekting board," The Vancouver Sun, July 20, 1981 at A-9 col. 1.
138 Here we should note some of the failures of the regulatory reformers in the
Carter administration. They range from the inability to place certain kinds of reforms
on the Presidential agenda-almost the full menu of proposals in the area of the new
social regulation fall into this category-to embarrassment in Congress and deregula-
tion of the well-head price of natural gas and oil. See Jones, "Congress and the
Presidency," in Mann and Ornstein, supra note 64, 223 at 240.
139 Stanbury, Business Interests and the Reform of Canadian Competition Policy,
1971-75 (Toronto: Carswell/Methuen, 1977) at 45.
140 Hardin, A Nation Unaware: The Canadian Economic Culture (Vancouver: J.J.
Douglas, 1974) at 174.
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B. Endogenous Factors
1. The Legislative Process
If our understanding of the factors exogenous to the Canadian political
processes leads to a somewhat pessimistic evaluation of the prospects for
deregulation, might not a consideration of factors endogenous to it modify
this assessment? Certainly the structure of the Canadian legislative process
bears no relationship to that of the United States. Legislative decision-making
in Canada is highly centralized and party discipline is almost complete. As
Pross explains:
[T]he Canadian political system is based only to a limited degree on a pluralistic,
competitive approach to decision making.... The fact that the executive operates
within a cabinet and parliamentary system of government means that rivalries be-
tween legislators cannot be readily exploited. 141
In Canada, the Cabinet dominates every aspect of the policy process.
Cabinet has the power to set it in motion and to control its outcome. Cabinet
ministers, either collectively or individually, have the power to set goals and to
order the bureaucracy to design policies to achieve those goals.142 And, with a
majority government, the Prime Minister dominates Cabinet. 143
The traditional view holds that the virtually unchecked political authority
of Cabinet permits it to undertake bold, risky initiatives on behalf of the
public interest. This view assigns a minor role to interest groups in the
legislative process. Cabinet may listen to group representatives, because
political leaders are concerned about the consequences of their actions. In-
terest group support is a proxy for programme effectiveness. For example, if
the unions support policy X, it is usually safe for political decision makers to
assume that X will benefit labour. Hence, the traditional view holds that
Cabinet attends to special interests primarily because it wishes to avoid causing
harm to minority interests as it seeks to promote the interest of the many. Cer-
tainly this view of the Canadian political process would reject the notion that
Cabinet would cater to the special interests of one or more backbenchers (or
even Ministers) and their constituents to the detriment of the public interest and,
therefore, the party's majority.
14t Pross, "Introduction," in Pross (ed.) Pressure Group Behaviour in Canadian
Politics (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1975) at 18. See also Lesbowitq and Tollison,
A Theory of Legislative Organization (1980), 94 Quarterly Journal of Economics 261
and Thompson, American Legislative Decision Making and the Sigi Principle (1979), 73
American Political Science Review 1100.
142The ECC in its Interim Report on the Regulation Reference, supra note 1, at 57
notes: "In practice, Canadians periodically elect a 'collective king', i.e., a cabinet that
has enormous power." The Council, therefore, was "not too sanguine about the linch-
pin in the concept of accountability in a system of responsible government: ultimate ac-
countability to the people."
143 See Campbell, S.J., "Political Leadership in Canada: Pierre Elliott Trudeau
and the Ottawa Model," in Rose and Suleiman, eds., Presidents and Prime Ministers
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Inst., 1980) 50; Hockin, ed., Apex of Power:
The Prime Minister and Political Leadership In Canada (2nd ed. Toronto: Prentice-
Hall, 1977); and Matheson, The Prime Minister and the Cabinet (Toronto: Methuen,
1976).
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One problem with the traditional view is that it is fundamentally inconsis-
tent with the fact that, until very recently, regulatory policy outcomes in both
the United States and Canada were remarkably similar. Not only did both
countries regulate the same things in much the same way at the same levels of
government, 144 the rent creating consequences of their regulatory activities
were practically identical-inefficiency combined with redistribution in most
cases from the many to the few. In other words, regulatory outcomes in both
countries reflected the pattern of bias characteristic of interest group politics.
Such similar outcomes must have been produced by similar legislative and
policy processes.
2. The Failure of Party Politics
In the face of the evident differences between the constitutional structures
and political systems of the two countries, the similarity of regulatory out-
comes may seem an almost absurd conclusion. It should seem less so, however,
if it is understood that in the United States, legislative responsiveness to in-
terest group demands is primarily explained by what might be called incum-
bancy maximization. That is, every legislator is, in the words of the title of a
recent popular psychology book, "looking out for number one". Similar out-
comes would likely occur in Canada if the government party were to accept in-
cumbancy maximization as a collective goal. The hard question is why would a
responsible Cabinet government choose to maximize incumbancy rather than
the number of seats it obtains?
To this question we can only offer a tentative answer. A Liberal federal
government (a Conservative provincial government in Ontario or Alberta,
etc.) might choose to maximize incumbancy, but a Conservative government
would not. A Liberal Cabinet might not maximize seats because it does not
have to. 145 The reliability of Liberal party support in Quebec (reinforced by
Cabinet's power to determine the frequency and timing of elections, 146 com-
bined with the ability to spend large sums of public money on regular, con-
fidential polling) means that the Liberal majority is largely insulated from the
requirements of competitive party politics. Perhaps, therefore, incumbancy
maximization is collectively pursued at least in part as a result of the absence
of vigorous, effective interparty competition.
Note that in a competitive market, management must seek to maximize
profit if the firm is to survive. By analogy, the governing party in a competitive
political market must seek to maximize its majority (seats) in order to stay in
144 See Stanbury and Thompson, supra note 4.
1
45 It is hard not to conclude that federally Canada is a "democratic, one-party
state." The Liberals have held office for almost 40 of the past 46 years. (We might note
that in Ontario the same is true for the Conservative Party.) For some of the reasons
this is the case, see, for example, Whitaker, The Government Party: Organizing and
Financing the Liberal Party of Canada, 1930-58. (U. of Toronto Press, 1977); Perlin,
The Tory Syndrome: Leadership Politics in the Progressive Conservative Party (Mon-
treal: McGill-Queens Press, 1980); Simpson, Discipline of Power: the Conservative In-
terlude and the LiberalRestoration (Toronto: Personal Library, 1980).
146See the discussion in Gwynn, The Northern Magus (Toronto: PaperJacks,
1981), chs. 18, 19.
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(gain) power. In Canada federal political power is highly centralized and party
discipline is almost complete. By analogy, a legislator in a competitive political
market must seek to maximize votes if he is to be re-elected. 147 Under com-
petitive conditions, economic or political actors have little or no discre-
tion-they must respond appropriately to market-determined conditions (that
is, demands and costs). Under monopoly, on the other hand, a firm's manage-
ment has a degree of latitude or discretion that does not exist in a competitive
market. The monopoly firm may use its discretion to restrict production, in-
crease price, and earn excess profits. It may choose to be inefficient and ab-
sorb potential excess profits (monopoly rent) in this fashion, or it may be
benign and establish a price and output combination similar to that which
would occur under competitive conditions.
Similarly, Cabinet may use its monopoly power to restrict the supply of
new legislation to the minimum required for re-election and utilize its
"monopoly rent" (if any) to satisfy the personal preferences of those who con-
trol the governing party. 148 Alternatively, Cabinet may use its discretion to
"fritter away" its monopoly rent by adopting inefficient policies or by giving
to interest groups more than is necessary to ensure their support. Finally,
Cabinet may behave as a "benign monopolist" and offer the same volume
(and types) of new legislation as would be offered under competitive
conditions. 149
To say that the federal Liberal Cabinet is relatively exempt from the con-
147 More precisely perhaps, he must focus on the marginal voter. The politician
must operate a sort of triage system. Die-hard supporters must be attended to, but large
amounts of political capital need not be expended on them. Similarly, there is little
point in offering extensive blandishments to "dyed-in-the-wool" opponents-although
they should not be gratuitously insulted. The bulk of the politician's efforts and
resources must be directed at swaying the marginal voter in his direction. The important
question here has to do with who the marginal voters are and what it will take to get
them to support the incumbent. Our argument is that they cannot be easily identified by
party leaders, nor can their preferences be easily met. Consequently, the one universally
sound policy prescription for a seat maximizing party leader is to manage the economy
well, i.e. maintain real per capital economic growth and low unemployment. This
prescription will not, however, sit well with the individual MP who wants to maximize
his vote and who can (or believes he can) identify the marginals in his riding. See note
64, supra. See also Thompson, Closeness Counts in Horseshoes and Dancing... and
Elections (1982), 38 Public Choice 305.
148 Prime Minister Trudeau's obsession with the constitution and national unity ap-
pears to fall into this category. Campbell, S.J., supra note 143, at 92 remarks:
the Prime Minister continued to pour most of his energy into the national unity
issue, even though the Parti Qu~b~cois faced severe problems of its own, and in
countless pools for more than a year before the election Canadians listed national
unity far down a list of grievances led by concerns about the economy.
Perhaps the results of the by-election in Spadina injected a note of reality into the PM's
crusade. See "A sharp rebuke to the groin", Maclean's, 31 Aug. 1981 at 26-28.
149 Both an economic and a political monopolist may decide to use their discre-
tionary power to engage in discrimination and redistribution to benefit some
buyers/voters at the expense of others. The Canadian federal political system appears to
engage in a vast array of direct and indirect redistributive exercises with little concern
for efficiency (allocative, technical or dynamic). The net result of all of this distributive
cross-hauling is small, however, when one looks at the aggregative income distribution
data over a decade or more.
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straints that would be imposed upon it by interparty competition does not, of
course, necessarily imply that it will employ its discretion to maximize incum-
bancy or cater to pressure group demands. It has considerable discretion
within certain limits to do pretty much whatever it wants. What it will do
depends on the preferences of its memebers, their political and bargaining
skills, the kind of leadership exercised by the Prime Minister and so forth.
We have reason to believe, that Liberal MPs reject seat maximization as
unethical, dangerous to the party influential, and unfair to the party faithful.
According to Lovink, who based his conclusions upon a careful survey of
Liberal MPs in the 28th Parliament, most are strongly committed to their own
and each others re-election.150 They would almost certainly reject the idea that
a backbencher should be sacrificed for the good of the party. Furthermore,
Lovink demonstrates that the Liberals have been fairly successful in maximiz-
ing incumbancy. Turnover rates in Parliament have tended to fall over the past
two or three decades and now approximate those of the United States
Congress! 151
Apparently, the Liberal Cabinet is, in fact, concerned about maximizing
incumbancy. Since maximizing incumbancy leads to responsiveness to special
interests, and because interest group legislation is biased, this may explain why
Parliament often behaves like Congress, at least, in part, and with respect to
regulatory policies and practices. The federal Liberals need not be so respon-
sive to interest groups. A Liberal Cabinet, could choose to be less responsive.
Perhaps, after more pressing matters are dealt with or under different leader-
ship, it will.
Ironically, ceterisparibus, incumbancy maximization ultimately increases
the probability that the Liberals will lose power. The Conservatives, as a result
of their more tenuous position, might be more responsive to the requirements
of party politics than their predecessors. This means they would be more con-
cerned about seat maximization and, perhaps, this would favour the prospects
for deregulation.
In the meantime, it seems that, in the absence of strong support from the
Prime Minister or from a strong Cabinet Minister with a major regulatory
role 152 who supports regulatory reform, Cabinet will not exercise its con-
150 Lovink, Is Canadian Politics Too Competitive? (1973), 6 Canadian Journal of
Political Science 341 as reprinted in Richard Schultz et al., eds., The Canadian Political
Process (3rd ed. Toronto: Holt, Rinehart & Winston of Canada, 1979) at 145-75. See
also Thompson, "Legislative Committees, Workload, Party Discipline, and Incumban-
cy," unpublished manuscript, Graduate Program in Public Policy and Administration,
Columbia University, July 1982.
151 Jackman, not incidentally, has observed that national factors are now much less
influential in determining the Liberal proportion of the total vote in national elections
than they once were. Indeed, when he conducted his analysis, they had dropped nearly
to zero, while the regional and especially riding specific components of the variance had
increased. Jackman, Political Parties, Voting and National Integration: The Canadian
Case (1971-72), 4 Comparative Politics 511, reprinted in Schultz et al., eds., supra note
150, at 130-44.
152 The Minister of Transport has already issued a discussion paper, "Domestic Air
Carrier Policy (Unit Toll Services)" (Aug. 14, 1981) that would increase the restrictions
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siderable discretion on behalf of regulatory reform. As noted above, the Prime
Minister's interests are otherwise engaged. Moreover, many Liberal Cabinet
Ministers are philosophically inclined toward more government interven-
tion. 153 Therefore, we would conclude that it is highly unlikely that Cabinet
will seek to promote comprehensive regulatory reform.
3. The Importance of the Bureaucrats
In practice, the power to initiate policies has, in large part, been assumed
by the bureaucracy. Most new policy proposals are initiated by and take shape
within the bureaucracy. That was certainly the case with the initial work to
assess the performance of regulation. 1
54
Although Cabinet will not act on its own on behalf of regulatory reform,
Cabinet Ministers are unlikely to respond to the initiatives of the public serv-
ants in their bureaux. This is not because bureaucrats are especially responsive
to special interests. While most interest group representations in Ottawa are
directed at the bureaucracy, the public servant/interest group relationship
tends, or has tended, to be dominated by the public servants.
155
In the past, perhaps, the civil servant's propensity to exclude from the
process of policy making all but legitimate, well-behaved, and quasi-official
groups, may have somewhat exacerbated the bias of interest group representa-
tion. But recent reforms have tended to open the process to a far wider circle
of stakeholders. Today, public servants are required to clear nearly all self-
initiated proposals with practically everyone. 156 This has certainly made their
job harder and increased the uncertainty of the policy process. It has also likely
on competition and foreclose all possibility of entry. The presidents of Air Canada and
CP Air have already condemned the ECC's proposals to gradually deregulate the in-
dustry (infra). The Minister of Agriculttire has already made vituperative comments on
the Council's recommendations to stop the spread of supply management schemes and
to expand the quota volumes under existing ones-see Stanbury and Thompson, supra
note 4, at ch. 3.
153 This would apply to 'most of the Quebec ministers, to the honourable Mr.
Lalonde in particular, and the leading nationalist/interventionist, the honourable Mr.
Herb Gray. See, for example, Robertson, "The New Patriots", Today Magazine 25
April, 1981 at 8-11. In a recent speech Peter C. Newman, former editor of Maclean's,
has argued that, "In their unyielding aim to preserve themselves in political power,
governments will attempt to move the private sector into a system of compulsory plan-
ning that will destroy the free enterprise system .... Almost certainly, key companies
within pace-setting industries will be nationalized. . . ." "Duel to set the path for
Canada", The Globe and Mail (Toronto), Sept. 1, 1981 at 8, col. 1. See also Diebel,
"Plan sets economic overhaul", The Vancouver Sun, Sept. 18, 1981 at 1; see also the
columns in the same paper by Lamb, September 18, 21 and 23, 1981 at A-4.
154 See the discussion in Stanbury and Thompson, supra note 4.
155 See, e.g., Gwynn, supra note 146, at ch. 5, who states that "without realizing he
was doing it, Trudeau bureaucratized the cabinet." The Clerk of The Privy Council, we
are told, forbade ministers from bringing their political aides to Cabinet committee
meetings. Instead, they were accompanied by senior public servants. "Bureaucrats thus
entered the mainstream of political decision-making and were all the more influential
because ... they were so adroitly deferential." (at 88).
156 In fact, the lack of interparty competition may be somewhat offset by the often
fierce policy debates that occur among various federal departments. Certain depart-
ments (e.g. Agriculture; Health and Welfare; Industry, Trade and Commerce) do repre-
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reduced the power of well entrenched groups to influence the direction of
policy changes on their own behalf (except insofar as they share in a veto
power with everyone else).
The real problem with the bureaucracy is not that it is particularly
enamoured of government intervention per se. 157 Civil servants, particularly
those at the top level, far more than their political masters, understand the
limits of government's power to do 'good' or overcome 'evil'. But bureaucrats
do tend to value stability. (We might recall that the credo of the British North
America Act is "peace, order and good government".) This preference,
perhaps, accounts for the fact that in the past, various departments sought to
discipline their client groups in order to keep them in line, speaking with one
voice, and adhering to the departmental position. As one wag put it, "there is
no 'Organization of Potential Entrants' in Ottawa, if there had been,
Transportation or ITC would have squashed it."
Furthermore, in a number of cases, civil servants have a direct interest in
the regulatory status quo. Deregulation would reduce the size and power of
their bureaux. It could also liquidate the value of their personal human capital
in the form of regulatory expertise. Finally, there is the cost of change itself.
Decades of experience must be "unlearned". Old dogmas must be abandoned.
This does not mean, of course, that regulatory reform or even deregula-
sent their "clients" interests. Central agencies (e.g. The Privy Council O-ffice, Treasury
Board) tend to take a broader view. See, e.g., Protheroe, Imports and Politics (Mon-
treal: The Inst. for Research on Pub. Pol'y, 1980). Presthus and Monopoli (see note
157, infra) state: "Contrary to the belief that interest groups are primarily an American
phenomenon, our data suggest that Canadian bureaucrats, even more than Americans,
respond affirmatively to lobbyists." (at 186). In both cases, one-half the Ottawa and
Washington officials described their relationship with lobbyists as either "almost an in-
tegral part of our day-to-day activity" or "usually taken into account during policy-
making." The fraction for state and provincial officials was even higher (52%7o and 68%,
respectively). Almost one-half the Canadian federal and provincial officials said their
own or another department had created an interest group to facilitate implementation
of a program or policy (at 187).
157 Hartle (supra note 43, at 76) argues that "the most senior public officials, par-
ticularly those who support ministers with collective responsibilities [e.g., central agen-
cies] to the Cabinet as a whole ... resist as strongly as their influence allows more
government intervention. They feel that the burdens they carry are already stagger-
ing.... " On the other hand, Presthus and Monopoli, Bureaucracy in the United States
and Canada: Social, Attitudinal and Behavioral Variables (1977), 18 Int'l. J. Comp.
Soc. 176, found that on their measure of "economic liberalism" (i.e., willingness to
have government intervene in the economy) 29% of Canadian federal bureaucrats
scored "high" as compared with 11% for Canadian provincial officials, 9% for U.S.
federal and 16% for U.S. state officials. They also found that, "For those for whom
bureaucratic norms presumably have had an opportunity to take hold [5 or more years
of service], there seems to be a linear movement away from economic conservatism, and
especially among the Canadian sample." (at 182). Presthus and Monopoli found that
the bureaucrats "do not share the unrestrained welfare capitalist preferences of their
political masters." (at 182). At the same time, they found that "Canadian bureaucrats
have much stronger perceptions of the influence of their role than do their American
peers." (at 184). We note that Canada achieved an enlightened railway rate policy under
the National Transportation Act of 1967. This policy was apparently developed and
promoted by the bureaucracy although it of course had ministerial support in its enact-
ment.
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tion is not possible.158 It means no more than that regulatory ministries are
unlikely to embrace it or that deregulatory proposals are unlikely to be in-
itiated in regulatory departments, for example, Agriculture, Transportation,
and Communications. But support for such proposals may be expected from
other quarters of the bureaucracy, for example, Privy Council Office,
Treasury Board, Department of Finance and Consumer and Corporate Af-
fairs. Moreover, the same reforms that required departmental decision-makers
to clear their proposals with a wider circle of stakeholders have also increased
the power and influence of these coordinating units and the staff departments
concerned with the delivery of public services, the oversight of its activities,
and the general performance of the economy.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Generally speaking, we have little patience with casual references to
political infeasibility. In most cases, the issue of political infeasibility is a
smokescreen put up by those who, for whatever reason, do not want to enter-
tain the possibility of change or who want to resist the particular change itself.
At best, the claim that something is not politically feasible is a defence advanced
by those who have lost the battle on its merits. At worst, it is a concession of
defeat before the battle has been engaged. As Gaskins explained, after the
deregulators took on the truckers and the Teamsters on the floor of Congress
and won, "lots of things are politically feasible if you are clever enough to
figure out what you want and attempt to get it." 159
The conundrum of obtaining deregulation has yet to be solved. Hartle
and Trebilcock propose that the first step toward general regulatory reform in
Canada is greater governmental funding for public interest groups.16° They
hope, thereby, to somewhat offset the bias of interest group representa-
tion-in their view, the principal cause of inefficient and inequitable aspects of
regulatory policies and the major obstacle to change. Regardless of the
relevance of their proposal to regulatory reform, public funding of public in-
terest groups is an appealing idea. 161 Furthermore, it has the advantage of
familiarity. For example, most of the money for the Consumers' Association
158 See Anderson, "The Philosophy of the MacPherson Royal Commission and the
National Transportation Act: A Retrospective Essay," in Studnicki-Gizbert, ed., Issues
in Canadian Transport Policy (Toronto: Macmillan, 1974) 47 and "Discussion" id. at
72 and Darling, "Transport Policy in Canada: The Struggle of Ideologies versus
Realities," id. at 3. We specifically exclude the Crow's Nest Pass grain rates from our
approving statement. See Harvey, Christmas Turkey or Prairie Vulture: An Economic
Analysis of the Crow's Nest Pass Grain Rates (Montreal: The Inst. for Research on
Pub. Pol'y, 1980).
159 Gaskins, former chairman of the ICC quoted in Graymer and Thompson, eds.,
supra note 72.
1
60 Hartle and Trebilcock, Regulatory Reform and the Political Process (1982), 20
Osgoode Hall L.J. XX.
161 See Reforming Regulation, 1981, supra note 13, at 134-36 which recommends
that costs be awarded to public interest groups appearing before regulatory agencies,
that governments provide longer-term funding for public interest groups, and that
through the tax system governments encourage small, individual contributions to such
groups even though they may engage in a small amount of political activity. See also
Ross, "Cancelled due to lack of interest", Maclean's, 6 July 1981 at 42-43.
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of Canada's (CAC) Regulated Industries Program' 62 now comes from the
federal government. If the CAC has not been too effective, perhaps this is
because it has not had adequate resources. 1
63
Indeed, the possibility of greater use of private interests to promote the
public interest is intriguing. Imagine the effect of encouraging the formation
of groups with a direct interest in freer entry or more flexible prices in directly
regulated industry. Imagine, too, a world in which the directory of Ottawa
lobbies included the "Organization of Potential Entrants". But as appealing
as this idea is, it is a fantasy. Moreover, even if one knew how to bring it into
being, promotion of countervailing group activity seems a rather roundabout
approach to regulatory reform. For the present, we have greater faith in the
power of ideas-if they are given the time to be diffused and to become com-
mon currency.
Proponents of deregulation should, therefore, keep making the case for
reform on its merits. Without good evidence, 164 the case for deregulation can-
not win. If at times it seems that no one is listening to the evidence, maybe
there just has not been enough time for its implications to sink in or, perhaps,
we are providing the wrong kind of evidence, or are providing it in the wrong
way or to the wrong people. What at first seems radical and threatening, with
the passage of time may become the conventional wisdom.
Of course, as noted, we do not honestly believe that comprehensive
regulatory reform or even deregulation of a few industries is likely at this time.
If anything, the trend is in the opposite direction; in the short run, we expect
more, not less, regulation. If so, then for the next few years the best we can
hope for is to retard the growth of government control of the economy.
Fortunately, we do know how to retard the growth of regulation: regulate
it. Procedural or structural reforms will not lead to substantive reform, 165 but
might mitigate the excesses caused by overzealous regulators or correct the
more perverse incentives facing the regulatory bureaucracy. The American ex-
perience with a variety of regulatory review mechanisms, together with the
Canadian experience with the SEIA program, demonstrates that ex ante review
of regulatory proposals can slow down the output of new initiatives. 166 In
162 For a report on this program, see Janisch, "Regulation and the Consumer In-
terest," speech to the Consumers' Association of Canada, Hamilton (June 18, 1980,
mimeo).
163 See Kane, Consumers and the Regulators: Intervention in the Federal
Regulatory Process (Montreal: Inst. for Research on Pub. Pol'y, 1980).
164The most detailed and consistent evidence in Canada is that on the adverse ef-
fects of supply-management marketing boards. There is now more than a score of such
studies from a variety of different sources: The Consumer Research Council; the In-
stitute for Research on Public Policy and the Economic Council; the Department of
Finance; the Royal Commission on the Canadian Dairy Commission; and the Fraser In-
stitute. The weight of such studies and the publicity they have obtained has made the
present federal Minister of Agriculture (Eugene Whelan) and the heads of a number of
marketing boards and farm organizations remarkably defensive lately. See Stanbury
and Thompson, supra note 4.
165 See the proposals set out in the documents in notes 6, 11, 12 and 14, supra.
166 See Eads, Harnessing Regulations: The Evolving Role of White House Over-
sight (1981), 5 Regulation 19.
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other words, if we can not strike directly at our large regulatory stock, we can
work at the margin-the annual flow of new regulations.
As noted above, there is considerable consensus among experts about
what should be done to regulate regulation: require ex ante review using some
form of cost-benefit analysis, require earlier and more extensive consultation,
create a regulatory agenda, replace appeals to Cabinet by government policy
directives, define clearer regulatory mandates in statutes and regulations, have
the legislature scrutinize proposed new regulations more closely and evaluate
existing regulatory programmes. More important, these proposals have been
widely endorsed by the media, most interest groups, and even tentatively by
the government.
Therefore, proponents of regulatory reform should support the im-
plementation of these procedural reforms. Requiring the regulators to justify
their decisions may not result in better decisions, but it should slow the out-
pouring of new regulations. For the time being, this is very likely the best out-
come we can hope for.
American Experience
APPENDIX A*
SUMMARY OF THE ECONOMIC COUNCIL OF CANADA'S
RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO DIRECT REGULATION.
1. Railroads
- Increase the speed and freedom of the CTC to respond to grievances
under the "captive shipper" provisions of the Railway Act.
- Disallow intermodal acquisitions where the efficiency gains do not offset
the harmful effects on competition.
- Review the exemptions from the Combines Investigation Act.
2. Trucking
- Remove all regulatory restrictions on the operating freedom of existing
for-hire carriers.
- Abolish all rate-filing or tariff-setting regulations.
- Administer all licensing of interprovincial carriers through the Canadian
Conference of Motor Transport Administrators rather than the
provinces.
- Permit entry based only on carriers meeting minimum technical re-
quirements on a first-come, first-served basis (note, the provinces could
still control entry).
3. Taxicabs
- Gear price and entry controls toward a very gradual reduction in the
market value of taxicab licences (including special licences to serve air-
ports).
- Licence cabs over an entire urban area.
- Permit all licenced cabs to serve airports when existing exclusive con-
tracts expire.
4. Airlines
- Allow new entry based on a "one-way swinging gate" approach (i.e., the
regionals could freely enter the national carriers' markets, but not vice-
versa for several years).
- Allow completely open entry into transborder operations (subject to
U.S. requirements).
- Remove all restrictions on service immediately and prohibit all informal
understandings regarding entry or service levels, etc..
- Allow abandonment of any service within eight months.
- Allow all airlines to establish such fares as they see fit; increases in an ex-
isting fare above the annual rate of inflation must be approved by the
CTC.
- Greatly liberalize domestic and international charter regulations.
- Greatly strengthen section 27 of the National Transportation Act con-
cerning mergers.
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- Ensure that government-owned carriers are not favoured or restricted by
government or regulatory policy.
5. Telecommunications
- Encourage entry and the provision of specialized private-line and data
communications services; at the same time, prevent refusal to supply or
discriminatory pricing and require interconnection as in the CNCP case.
- Remove all restrictions on the leasing and resale of long-haul transmis-
sion facilities including satellites.
- Permit all forms of attachment unless the devices can be shown to result
, in technical harm to the telephone system.
- Require regulated carriers entering the direct-sale market for equipment
or competitive services to do so through an arms-length affiliate.
6. Agricultural Marketing Boards
- Exercise caution in creating additional boards with supply management
powers. (Note, in the text (p.65) the Council took a stronger position,
saying it "has considerable difficulty justifying the continued existence,
-or the creation of, new supply management boards with exclusive
powers to deiermine prices and set production quotas for individual pro-
ducers .... )
Expand output quotas (and reduce prices) over five to ten years in order
to bring quota values down to "reasonable levels".
Make output quotas divisible and freely transferable among individual
producers; make all future output quotas and a significant proportion of
existing quotas freely transferable within Canada; relax other restric-
tions on quotas that impair efficiency.
Re-examine the objectives, terms and structure of the industrial milk
subsidy program; make the Milk Supply Management Committee and
the Canadian Dairy Commission subject to the supervision of the Na-
tional Farm Products Marketing Council.
- Ensure that there is a balance of producer, consumer and processor
representation on agricultural supervisory boards; permit appeal to the
supervisory board where an individual can show substantial injury from
the actions of a commodity board.
7. Tidal Fisheries
- Regulate individual ocean fisheries through a system of transferable,
quantitative, stinted landing rights based on optimal sustainable yields.
- Supplement the system of stinted landing rights by the use of landing
taxes, license fees, and/or buyback schemes.
- Review the federal and provincial direct subsidies in the form of grants
or low-interest loans on gear or various tax incentives with a view to
phasing them out gradually.
*Sou'rce: from ECC, Reforming Regulation 1981, (Ottawa: Min. of Supply and
Services Can., 1981),.
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